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CHAPTER ONE

ANCIENT REFLECTIONS ON IDENTITY AND ITS PROBLEMS*
A STUDY OF ARISTOTLE ’3 VIEWS

§1 Introduction
There is a principle that states:
^ and y are identical, then every attribute of
the one is an attribute of the other

JLZ.

Often called "Leibniz's Law," or "one-half of Leibniz's Law,"
the principle does not seem to be due to Leibniz at all.

Scholarly investigations of late have turned up no evidence
that II (the Indiscernibility of Identicals) is among the
principles asserted by that philosopher. 1

Some

have thought the principle due to Aristotle.

—myself

included'

Specifically,

Aristotle's discussion of numerical sameness in Topica contains
some remarks that suggest very strongly that he there subscribes
to a principle indistinguishable from II

.

Now an interesting discussion occurs in

Elenchis (hereafter "SE"

)

,

c.

De_

Sophisticis

24, at 179a27-b7, which work

was written, it is generally believed, at about the same time
as Topica .

The discussion is interesting because it concerns

a certain fallacious argument, due to the Sophists, which

raises an apparent difficulty for II .

Aristotle purports

to expose the fallacy in the argument but does so in a way

that implies a retraction of some views expressed in Topica .

The Sophists' argument, as I shall construct it, holds that
(P)

Coriscus and the approaching man are identical.
Coriscus.

I

do not know the approaching man.

implies
1

I

know

2

(C)

I

know and do not know the same man.

X should

remark at once that Aristotle has no word for
"identical."
However, "rocurov" ("same") is used sometimes by him to
express
something like, if not exactly, the sense of "identical."
This
sense is expressed, for example, in Aristotle's use of "tcv Glvt'ov "
("the same man") in the sentence of which (c) is the
translation
(SjE

179M) •

I make

the simplifying assumption that "raurov" is

used on these occasions to express exactly the sense of "identical."
On this assumption, then, we have the means within Aristotle's
language to express the sense of (p).
Thus, in Aristotle's writings we find what seems to be
a formulation of the Iniiscernibility of Identicals (il), as

well as a confrontation with a certain kind of argument that
is problematic

2

if 11 is accepted as an intuitively valid nrinciple.

Recently, a study by Nicholas
on sameness has appeared in print,

P.
^

White of Aristotle's views

which study represents the

most thorough scholarship to date on the topics dealt with in

this chapter.

The present discussion owes much to White's

researches, but theses are put forward here which are contrary
to some of those advanced by White.

White's study is edifying

and valuable, but some details of his exposition seem to me

mistaken.

Of these,

I

shall argue, one is his thesis that

in SB, c. 24 (and elsewhere), Aristotle puts a restriction on
II .

The point is not a small one, for the thesis implies that,

in the passage in question, Aristotle does not hold that identity

implies indiscernibility

.

I shall argue

that this consequence

is unfounded.

White
§ 2

'

s

Thesis

Although White believes that Aristotle's notion of numerical
sameness is only "something like" that of identity, he does not

3

deny that in Toxica Aristotle annunciates a
principle very much
llke H> and he does not attempt to
distinguish this principle
from II. That is, White gives II to Aristotle.
Actually,
White's formulation of the principle is:
LL

If A and

are identical, then whatever is true
of
the one is true of the other
J3

(I assume

that "A" and "B" are variables for White.
is a quantifier, and I assume that "z is
true of

x"

to "z is an attribute of x."

In short,

I

"Whatever"
is equivalent

assume that II and

LL are equivalent.)
But Aristotle does not long subscribe to the view
that
identicals are indiscernible, if White's account is correct;

for Aristotle's refutation of the Sophists' argument is
taken
by White to imply a retraction of that view. Wow I
certainly
agree with White that Aristotle's answer to the Sophists
betrays
a less than firm grasp of the concept of identity and
that

certain truths asserted in Topica (in particular, at 103a29 ff.)
are apparently retracted. However, I do not believe that this

answer implies a retraction of the view that identicals are
indiscernible
.

As implied, Aristotle's answer to the Sophists is taken
by White to signify an abandonment of II
More exactly, White
.

holds that in this passage Aristotle gives up II for a restricted
version of II. I shall call this "White's thesis." White cites
as evidence for his thesis a certain claim made by Aristotle
in the course of his refutation, to which claim I shall return

momentarily.

Quite independently of this line of thought, however,

White includes a diagnosis of Aristotle's troubles, which seems
to me mistaken and which I would like to dispense with quickly.

4

§ 3 Aristotle

1

s

Conception of the Problem

says that in SE Aristotle "is worried ... about
failures
of substitutivity of identity." 4 Now I
certainly do not see
what bearing this contention has on the question at
hand, unless
tfhite

tfhite

is using "substitutivity of identity" and "LL"
as names

of one and the same principle.

Reasons which lead one to

conjecture that these terms are being used to name the same
principle likewise lead one to wonder what this principle is.
The fact seems to be that two principles are simply being confused
throughout this portion of White's discussion. This is evidenced

by an earlier remark that in "precipitously giving his unrestricted
version of LL Aristotle fails to take precautions against contexts
in which, as Quine puts it, extensionality fails, and runs the
,

risk of encountering paradoxes."^
Principle is unrestricted

,

The sense in which Aristotle's

however, is the sense in which there

is no restriction on the kinds of attributes, or more literally,

predicables (ra KaTrjyopovfJ-CVa)

that same things have in common,

as White had just finished informing us.

One may formulate this

principle as LL, but one must beware that the result is still
a principle about things and attributes thereof, and not at all

about terms which may be substituted in some context.

"Substitutivity

of identity," on the other hand, customarily names a principle

about interchangeability of terms, but no such principle has

been ascribed by White to Aristotle.
Nor does Aristotle give the slightest clue that he is aware
that the fallacy in the Sophists' argument turns on equivocal

interpretations of the context, "I know
of which interpretations,

an instance of

II.

(P)

according to one

is true but is not the denial of

and hence does not imply (c) (for if (c)

follows from (P), then (c) follows from (p) by generalizing
on every occurrence of "Coriscus" and "the approaching man"

5

in (P); but if (p) is true, then occurrences inside
the context,
"I know
cannot validly be generalized on); and

according

to the other of which,

(p)

is the denial of an instance of II

and hence implies (c), but (p) is false. On the contrary,
Aristotle announces at the start that the fallacy is one that
depends on accident (an attribute), and his strategy in
^®i*^iing the Sophists is anticipated in the following statement

(l79a35-37):

"For it is clear ... that it is not necessary
that what is true of the accident is true of the thing as well."

These and subsequent remarks convince me that the issues that
concern Aristotle here are genuinely issues of indiscernibility

.

When Aristotle says that he may know Coriscus and not know the
approaching man, he is saying that the attribute of being known
by him may be an attribute of Coriscus and not an attribute of
the approaching man.

Consonant with his own usage, then,

is the denial of an instance

of

II_.

(p)

(p)

therefore implies (c),

for (C) is just a generalization on (p).
Nor, I believe, does White disagree with this reading.

Indeed, he has made the same point:

"As Aristotle sees it,

the problem is that one and the same thing would seem both to

have and to lack the attribute of being known by me."^

Moreover,

there is no doubt that Aristotle wants to avoid this problem.

That is, Aristotle wants to deny (c) and somehow tries to
show that (C) is not a valid conclusion from true premises.

§ 4

Difficulties for White

1

s

Thesis

Yet an obvious difficulty arises for White's thesis if

everything

I

have just said is true.

possibilities as that
that LI excludes.

I

For it is just such

know and do not know the same man

But if Aristotle has given up II, then he

is free to affirm (C), for this possibility is no longer excluded

6

After having stated Aristotle's problem, White says:
reason, ^Aristotle/ gives in and puts a new sort of

"For this

restriction

on LL."

But if Aristotle does this, then he is no
longer
committed to the view that identity implies
indiscernibility

Since a restriction on a principle has the effect of
excluding
from its provision something hitherto unexcluded, he
is committed
to the view that some instances of identity
but not the view

—

that all instances of identity

— imply

indiscernibility. But
this view is compatible with the proposition that some
identicals
are discernible.
Consequently, that one and the same thing both

has and lacks the attribute of being known by him is not obviously
a problem for Aristotle, on these assumptions. This consequence
seems, however, clearly at variance with the facts. As White,

himself, appears to agree, Aristotle views the state of affairs
expressed by (c) as a problem, and one that he wants to avoid.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that White's thesis is
true.
What, then, is Aristotle's strategy in refuting the Sophists?
I

submit that there is none.

On White's account of Aristotle's

moves, the restriction on II is intended to exclude from the

provision of the law identities that are accidental

between Coriscus and the approaching man.

,

like that

But if indiscernibility

is only said to hold for some, nonaccidental,

identicals, then

it is compatible with this restricted version of

n

that any

accidental identicals (like Coriscus and the approaching man)
are discernible.

Consequently, it is compatible with this

principle that (p) is true, and nothing in White's account

prevents Aristotle from affirming (p).

This leaves Aristotle

with no basis for refuting the argument as unsound.
we have already seen,

(P)

implies (C).

no basis for refuting the argument.

But, as

Hence, Aristotle has

7

§ 5

Counterthesis

My previous remarks do not of course prove that White's
thesis is false.

Nor do I suppose that I can prove the thesis

false.

However, a number of considerations seem to me to favor
the coun tert he s i s
There is, for one, the matter of giving a
.

satisfactory account of Aristotle's counterargument in the
passage under consideration. The puzzle in the Sophists'
argument is that we seem to deduce from an apparently true
premise an impossible conclusion; namely, that identicals are
discernible.

If Aristotle has given up II, then it does not

follow that this conclusion is, for him, an impossible conclusion.
Yet, if it is possible that identicals are discernible, then
there is no puzzle.

It is easy to construct a valid inference

to the conclusion that I know and do not know the same man.

Let the premise be (P), above, as presently interpreted.

Moreover, there are no grounds for concluding that Aristotle
does not, in this passage, hold II to be a valid principle.

The statement which White takes as evidence for the proposition
that Aristotle puts a restriction on

I_I

is evidence for a different proposition,
I shall

presently defend that judgment.

(and hence gives up II)
in my judgment; and

There is, on the other

hand, evidence in this passage that Aristotle does hold II to
be a valid principle.

That evidence is in the form of Aristotle's

unwillingness to allow that one and the same thing is discernible:
both has and lacks the attribute of being known by him.

On the

presumably safe assumption that Aristotle follows up trivial
consequences of his beliefs and is rational with respect to his
beliefs, then what Aristotle affirms is that same things (in
this sense of "same") are indiscernible.

sameness is just the notion of identity

But that notion of

8

White's thesis is based on a certain kind of claim
made
by Aristotle in this passage and elsewhere. Let
White

state

his own case

:

^ristotle_7 retreats from saying without qualification
that if A_ and 13 are the same, then whatever is
true of

the one is true of the other.
Rather, he maintains (to
use his manner of putting it) that the same things
belong
only to things which are without difference and one
in
{substance (rcU Kara rr)v ovcCav a&tctcpcpoLS
;<al fv oZcIv).
This contention clearly retracts some of what has been
said at l52b_25-29j I52a33~37 (and an apparent application
of the former at 133b_31 ff.).°

Row I agree that Aristotle is putting a restriction, here,
on some indiscernibility principle, but not the Indiscernibility
of Identicals

Rather, the restriction must be one on the

.

Indiscernibility of Sames

00

;

that is, on:

If x and y are the same

in number,

then every attribute

of the one is an attribute of the other

Note that it will not do to argue that since (a) and II are

indistinguishable propositions (more or less assumed by White
and me), then, since Aristotle puts a restriction on (A), then

Aristotle puts a restriction on II; for while (A) and II may be
indistinguishable propositions, it does not follow that Aristotle
knows this.

Indeed, the whole point of the restriction, if I

am right, is that Aristotle now believes that the notions of

numerical sameness and identity are distinguishable
As I see the situation, Aristotle is struggling, here,
and in Physics
of identity .

,

at 2l2bl4-l6, with the problem of the conditions

Put Aristotle has no word for "identity."

In

Topica , identity is conceived as sameness in number, and he
there announces the principle

(a).

In SE, Aristotle confronts

the Sophists' argument, and it is possible to speculate that,

failing to see where the fallacy in the argument really lies,

9

his grip on the notion of identity begins
to weaken.
He continues
to hold, as I have argued, that identity
implies indiscernibility
but he no longer continues to hold that
simple numerical sameness’
is identity.

Some things are the same in number,
but only
accidentally. Eecause, it now seems to him,
things that are
accidentally the same are discernible these,
he now wants to
,

say, are not identical.

What he says is that these are not
one in substance (?v OUCflv) and that only
things which are one
in substance are indiscernible.

The implication of the latter

pronouncement for (A) is that a qualification, or
restriction,
is necessary:
^ and y are one (the same in number) in substance,
then every attribute of the one is an attribute of
the other

In SE,

then, identity is conceived as sameness in number in
substance.

Thus, what were correctly taken to be identities in Topica
,
at 103a29 ff . , are now no longer so taken. Aristotle thus
refutes
the Sophists by denying the identity of Ccriscus and the approaching
man; hence, the truth of (p). At the same time, he advances a

new analysis of identity, resulting in the principle (A').

And
although it is difficult to see how the antecedent of (a*) can
rule out as identical things that are accidentally the same
(like Coriscus and the approaching man),

intention that it does.

it is Aristotle’s

This seems to me the most plausible

reading of this difficult passage.

v6 Conclusion

Let me review what I have been saying.

I

have been saying,

in agreement with White, that Aristotle's answer to the Sophists
in SE is a sign that his grasp of the concept of identity is less

10

firm nere than it is in Topica but, in disagreement
with White,
that this answer is not a sign that Aristotle
has abandoned II.
I have argued that the thesis that Aristotle
gives up
;

II for a

restricted version thereof misrepresents his
counterargument in
Accordingly , I have proposed an alternative account

of this

counterargument, which seems virtually to force
itself upon us.
Aristotle concludes his discussion by saying (l79b?-4)

that it
is not the case that if he knows Coriscus
and does not know the

approaching man, then he knows and does not know the same
man.
Thus, Aristotle says, in effect, but in the clearest
of terms,
that the inference from the last two conjuncts of
(p) to (o') is
invalid.

But the inference from the whole of (p) to (c) is

valid, and unmistakably so (for, on the present account,
"same”
in (C) has the sense of "identical," and
(p) is the denial of
an instance of II).

If Aristotle views

he must view (P) as impossible also.

(c) as impossible,

then

Since Aristotle grants

that Coriscus may have an attribute which the approaching man
lacks, then he must be denying their identity. He does deny
that they are one in substance and asserts that only things

which are one in substance are indiscernible

.

The more reasonable

conclusion to draw, then, is not that things are now conceived
to be identical in different ways, but that the notion of identity
has changed.

11

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

See, especially, Fred Feldman, '’Leibniz and
Leibniz' Law
The Philosophical Review 79 ( 1970 ), pp. 510-522.

’’

,

2

That the argument is problematic may justifiably be
questioned,
but I postpone a discussion of the question until
Chapter II.
Nicholas P. White, "Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness,"
The Philosophical Review 80 (1971), pp. 177-197
,

^Ibid .

^Ibid

,

p.

180.

. ,

p.

179.

There is some basis for doubting that "Ta KaTr]\opouj^€.va^
is translatable as "attributes."
It is evident that Aristotle
does not always distinguish the language he mentions from the
language he uses. Perhaps he did not recognize the importance
of this distinction.
One exegetical problem that results from
this practice is that^it is not clear, to me anyway, whether
Aristotle means by "ra KaT^opou/ACva, " in the present context,
attributes, predicate phrases, or a combination of both. One
predicable definition (Acr/of) is clearly a predicate phrase.
Thus, it is not clear to me whether Aristotle wishes to assert
II or

—

II«I

—

If x and y are identical, then every predicate phrase
true of the one is true of the other

II *1 is an instance of II; that is, II implies II. 1, but not
conversely. However, if we assume (as White and I do) that
II is intuitively unchallengeable, then whether Aristotle
is committed to IT or to _II._1> neither principle is falsified
by the Sophists' argument that he attempts to refute in SB
at 179a?7-b7»
For convenience, I shall suppose, along with
White, that Aristotle holds the broader principle II .
,

7

8
9

White, ££. cit .

„
Idem

p. 179*

.

Idem .

"^1 wish to express my gratitude to Vere Chappell and
Gareth Matthews for helpful discussions on these topics, as
well as suggestions for improving an earlier draft.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OP THE PROBLEM

$ 1

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the nature of
arguments like
the Sophists' argument.
I call any argument that has as
its

conclusion a paradox (as defined in
§3) a "puzzle," until
such time as the paradox is discovered not to
be an antinomy.
The common property of all puzzles under
consideration here
is that their conclusions are paradoxical if
the Indiscernibility
of Identicals (il) is accepted as an intuitively
valid principle
and hence a nondisavowable principle.

Often the source of difficulty in paradox-yielding
arguments
can be traced to some obscurity in the meaning of their
constituent
sentences.

It is this obscurity that induces the initial

affirmation of truth and deducibility, when falsehood or
nondeducibility is the case. Thus, we may say that the source
of paradoxicality in these cases is an obscurity in
the

initial interpretation of the constituent sentences. Solutions
in these cases are gotten by interpreting the sentences in
a

way that reconciles the argument with our intuitions about
truth and deducibility.
I speculate that Aristotle's troubles were due to problems

of interpretation.

It appears certain that Aristotle mislocates

the obscurity in the Sophists' argument.

He takes obscurity

to reside in the meaning of "ravrov," whereas it lay elsewhere.
It lay, as I prefer to view the matter, in semantical peculiarities
of its referential occurrences.

I

conclude the chapter with

an informal introduction to the distinction between what

"standard" and "nonstandard" referential occurrences.
12

I

call

13

§ 2

The Sophists

1

Argument Anew

In the previous chapter the question at issue
was whether
Aristotle's answer to the Sophists in SE, c.
24, at 179a27-b7,

implies a rejection of II.

which

Another, more difficult question,

have not attempted to answer, is whether Aristotle
does
in fact there reject _II.
Although I have questioned the grounds
I

of the thesis (Nicholas P. White's) that Aristotle
rejects II
in the passage in question, and proposed an alternative
thesis
of my own,

I have

not claimed to have disproved or proved

either thesis.

Aristotle's discussion is simply too imperspicuous
to this writer for him to presume to have a conclusive
answer

to the second question.
In addition to its imperspicuity

,

the discussion omits

explicit mention of the "fallacy" in question.

Some scholars
have supposed as given in the discussion that the relation

between Coriscus and the approaching man is one of identity.
But a number of considerations marshal against this supposition.
For one, Aristotle has no word for "identical."

Aristotle

does have a word for "same", but it is compatible with theses
put forward in Chapter I that Aristotle may hold that Coriscus

and the approaching man are the same man, while denying that

they are identical.

Such would be the case if Aristotle holds

that Coriscus and the approaching man are one in accident and

means by "6V ouJtV" ("one in substance") what we mean by
"identical."

Moreover, whereas Aristotle can say that Coriscus

and the approaching man are the same man, he does not.

In the

course of his refutation, Aristotle avoids specifying the

relation between Coriscus and the approaching man.
Nevertheless, if we do not assume that Coriscus and the

approaching man are even the same man, then there would appear
to be no fallacy to be refuted; no puzzle to be solved.

I shall,

14

on that account, assume as given in the
discussion that the
relation between Coriscus and the approaching
man is one of

numerical sameness.

Then, on this assumption, Aristotle

explicitly denies the implication to (c) from
the premise
that Coriscus has an attribute which the
approaching man
lacks, while implicitly granting that Coriscus
and the

approaching man are (in some sense) the same man.
Aristotle denies that (c) is implied by
(P

)

That is,

Coriscus and the approaching man are the same man.
I know Coriscus.
I do not know the approaching man.

In the previous chapter, discussion was facilitated
by
taking the Sophists' argument to contain the premise
(p).

In this chapter, my concern is very much with the way
in
which the Sophists’ argument presented itself to Aristotle,

and where (p) contains "identical," the original premise
shall be assumed to contain some grammatical form of

the

ubiquitous "rcrurcv" ("same").

Accordingly,

I

shall henceforward

speak of the Sophists' argument as the argument that
implies (c).
I shall

be concerned,

in part,

(p»

in this chapter with

the question, why Aristotle failed to dispatch the puzzle
in a satisfactory way.

We can answer this question in ways

widely varying in cognitive signif icance

.

A species of the

more significant variety is preferred here, for which

I

shall

want an answer to the prior question, why the Sophists'
argument, and any argument of that ilk, is a puzzle in the

first place.

§ 3

Puzzles and Paradoxes

It will be worthwhile to explore the nature of Aristotle's

puzzle, for it is a puzzle of a kind that will occupy permanent

15

interest.

To this end

rather than puzzles.

I shall,

for the moment, talk of paradoxes
Specifically, I shall talk of paradoxes,

as that term is understood in W. V. Quine's
"The Ways of Paradox." 1
In that essay Quine provides clear and useful
characterizations
of three kinds of paradox, of which antinomies
are hut one.

As there and here conceived, a paradox is any
statement that
at first seems absurd, hut for which statement
there
is an

argument that at first seems to sustain it; that
is, the premise
does not seem to be one that we can disavow, and
the reasoning
does not seem to he fallacious. Paradoxes, then,
are conclusions
of arguments.

So understood, we can speak of (c), in the
Sophists' argument, as a paradox; for (c) seems at
first (and
is) absurd, and (c) is the conclusion of an argument
that

seems at first to sustain it.
Let us now characterize more precisely the kinds of paradox
that (c) may he.
(c) is either:
(l) not deducihle from a

premise by accepted ways of reasoning;

(

2

)

deducihle by accepted

ways of reasoning from a disavowahle premise; or
(3) deducihle
by accepted ways of reasoning from a ncndisavowable premise.
If

(c)

If

(C) is

is (l),
(

2 ),

then (c) is said to be a "falsidical paradox."
then we are instructed to view paradoxicality

as attaching to the denial of the premise.

To deny the premise

seems at first absurd, but there is a sound argument to sustain
the denial.

The denied premise is called a "veridical (truth-

telling) paradox."

Finally, if (c) is (3), then (c) is called,
in familiar parlance, an "antinomy."

The general idea of a puzzle is that it is any situation,
sentence, or set of sentences, that calls for an explanation,
but which explanation is hidden.

Clearly, some arguments that

have paradoxes as their conclusions satisfy these conditions.
In particular, every argument that has a paradox as its conclusion,

prior to the discovery that that paradox is (l),

(

2 ),

or (3),
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above, satisfies these conditions.
Every such argument, then,
will be called a puzzle.
So understood, we can speak of
the
Sophists argument as a puzzle, prior to
the discovery that
•

(C) is

(1),

(

2 ),

or

(3).

It is not true, however,

that every argument that has
a paradox as its conclusion ceases
to be a puzzle as soon as

this discovery is made.
case of antinomies.

Explanations remain hidden in the
It is for this reason that antinomies

"bring on the crises in thought." 2

The discovery that a
paradox is (1) or (2), on the other hand,
occasions no such
crisis and, on the contrary, ceases to occasion
puzzlement.
Note ought to be taken of the special case in
which
a

conclusion is discovered to be (3), but the pattern
of
reasoning involved in its derivation is easily given
up.
The antinomy (if it is appropriate to call it
such) is
thereby inactivated, and in this case, also, the
argument
ceases to occasion puzzlement. Such cases will be
assimilated
to the category of falsidical paradoxes, since the class
of accepted ways of reasoning is adjusted accordingly.

shall say that an argument with a paradox as its
conclusion ceases to be a puzzle, when and only when that
I

paradox is shown to be (l) or (2). What I have just said
implies that false explanations do not dispatch puzzles
of the paradox-yielding variety.

Should it be argued,

for example, that a paradox is falsidical, owing to a

fallacy at step Q, whereas the paradox is falsidical,
but the fallacy does not occur at step Q, the paradox
has not been shown to be (l), and thus the argument does
not cease to be a puzzle.

preference.

I

This usage is a matter of

prefer to think that philosophical puzzles

persist, as long as true explanations remain hidden.
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§

4 Aristotle

1

s

Problems of Interpretation

As argued in ^2, Aristotle would seem to have
to suppose
that Coriscus and the approaching man are, in some
sense,
the

same man.

And we Know that Aristotle supposes that he knows
Coriscus and does not know the approaching man. But
I have

already cited evidence that Aristotle interprets the
sentence,
of which "I know Coriscus and do not know the
approaching man"
is the translation, as expressing the discernibility
of Coriscus
and the approaching man; that is, the proposition that

Coriscus
has the attribute of being known by him, and the approaching
man lacks this attribute. Therefore, Aristotle would appear
to be committed to the supposition that the same man both has

and lacks the attribute of being known by him.

statement, White and

I

are in agreement.

Cn this last

Yet this supposition

seems to be indistinguishable from the proposition expressed
by (C), and Aristotle also appears to be arguing that the

inference from

(P'

)

to (C) is fallacious.

This is an oddity

of which neither White’s account nor my own provides an

easy explanation.
If my account is correct,

(p*

)

expresses, on Aristotle's

interpretation, a contingent proposition, but
instance of (C).

(P'

)

is not an

If my account is correct, Aristotle concludes

that (C) is falsidical, owing to an equivocation on "same".

Coriscus and the approaching man are the same in accident
but not the same

in.

substance

;

,

but the sense of "same" in (C)

is that of "same in substance."

This may seem an incredible interpretation, and Aristotle
is certainly not explicit about any of this, but it is the

most plausible reading

I

can give to the passage.

I

should

add that the above presentation of Aristotle's refutation

accords with White's account no less well than with my own.
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The accounts diverge only on the question whether Aristotle
conceives sameness in accident as identity; to be exact,
accidental identity. I have taken the fact that sameness
in accident does not, according to Aristotle, imply
indiscernibility
to suggest that the sense of "same” in (p*
is taken by

Aristotle

)

to be neither quite the sense of "identical" nor quite

the sense

of "similar," but a sense intermediate between the two.

If,

on the other hand, Aristotle does take the sense of "same"
in (P'

to be that of "identical," then

ray

and White's account is probably correct.

account is wrong,

Then "same man"

in (C) is short for "identical in substance ."

A contemporary account of the Sophists' argument would
hold that the argument is a puzzle only if (?'
can be
,

interpreted otherwise than as expressing discernibility.
(Doubtless, some will insist that

(P'

can not be interpreted

otherwise; hence, that there is no puzzle.
this question at the end of §5*)

I

return to

A contemporary will argue

that, if the Sophists' argument has a paradox as its conclusion,

then (c) is indeed a falsidical paradox; but the fallacy is
not due to any equivocation on "same".
a valid deduction from (P'

)

Rather,

(c)

is not

because the referring expressions,

"Coriscus" and "the approaching man," cannot be validly

generalized on inside the context, "I know ...," owing to
the absence of certain semantical properties on the part of

these expressions, which properties are necessary for

generalizing.

The absence of these properties is ordinarily

taken to show that the expressions do not refer in the
the way in which expressions refer

standard (usual) way:

when they occur inside so-called "extensional contexts."
I

am not convinced, however

evidence in SB

,

c.

24

— that

the sense in which (P'

)

— and

there is surely no

Aristotle had

a

clear grasp of

does not express discernibility.
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Nor does this seem to me to be so
surprising, for the idea
that referring expressions may fail on
some occasions to refer
in their usual way is an idea of
unusual subtlety
(not that

Aristotle was not capable of unusual subtlety).
Suppose, for
the sake of argument, that it is true
that Aristotle understood
the sentence of which (p*
is the translation in this singular
)
way. This would go some distance toward
accounting
for a

number of things.

Together with what

I

have already said,

it accounts for the evident weakening
in hi3 grip on the
notion of identity and therewith the solution
itself. For,
in conjunction with the present supposition,
evidence some
of which is rehearsed in the first paragraph
of this

—

section-

supports the hypotheses that Aristotle interprets the
sentence
of which (P*
is the translation, in what was perhaps the

natural way, as contingent

;

and that he interprets the

sentence of which (c) is the translation, in the natural
way, as necessarily false .
The combination of a reading of (c) as necessarily false,
a reading of (p*
as contingent, and a reading of (p»
as

expressing discernibility, would reasonably produce considerable
tension for any philosopher bent upon refuting the inference
from (P

1

)

to

(c).

Indeed, this formidable combination excludes

as plausible sources of difficulty everything in the argument
except "same" in (P )
If he is to prove the argument fallacious,
'

Aristotle must view the sense of "same M in (p
as different
)
from the sense of "same" in (C). This he apparently does
1

by construing the sameness of Coriscus and the approaching man
as accidental and the sameness of this man and that man as
,

substantial

,

if it obtains (cf

"x" and "y" in the symbolization

of (C) as "(Ex)(Ey)(x and y are the same man.
I do

not know y)").

I

know x.
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Aristotle's account bears an interesting
similarity to
many contemporary accounts, which construe
"Coriscus = the
approaching man" as contingent and "x = y" as
necessary
,

,

if sat isf iable

The important difference between the two
accounts is, of course, that Aristotle construes
as accidental
or substantial the relation of sameness;
whereas the contemporary
.

construes as contingent or necessary the sentence
expressing
the relation of sameness.
But the consequences of Aristotle's

distinction for the concept of identity are upsetting;
for
numerically same things are, or are not, identical,
on this
account, depending on how they are specified
?

On the assumption that my reconstruction of
Aristotle's
refutation is correct, then the argument that (c) is a
falsidical

paradox, owing to equivocation, can be seen to turn on
the
soundness of an argument for a veridical paradox; namely,

that

numerical sameness and identity are different relations (although
Aristotle would express the conclusion differently; namely, that
numerical sameness does not imply indiscernibility ) . Since
Coriscus and the approaching man are the same in number, then
it seems true

to say that they are identical (that is,

indiscernible); but Aristotle has an argument to show that
they are not identical, absurd as this conclusion at first
seems.

Having described Aristotle's puzzle and his solution
in these technical terms, it is now also possible to state
in a succinct way our counterargument to this solution:

If

the statement that numerical sameness is not identity is a

veridical paradox, then, by definition, there is a sound
argument to sustain the paradox.

Aristotle does produce

an argument for his conclusion, but this argument depends

upon the premise that things are not identical if they are
the same only accidentally

a premise that seems counterintuitive.
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As a postscript to the preceding discussion,
we might
consider, at least, the question whether
Aristotle took

the

Sophists' argument to have proved an antinomy,
which he presumed
to have eliminated hy eliminating (a) as
a logical principle.
The question whether (c) was an antinomy,
originally, is one
for which I assume no answer is known. We are
not told what
then-accepted pattern of reasoning, if any, the
Sophists took
their argument to invalidate.

However, it is not implausible

to suppose that the Sophists, like Aristotle,
mistakenly
supposed that (p« ) invalidated (a). At any rate
Aristotle's
,

discussion suggests no flaws with accepted ways of
reasoning,
and this suggests that (A) is not here taken to be
an accepted
principle

§ 5

Standard and Nonstandard Referential Occurrences
An Informal Introduction

Not uncommonly, the hidden explanations sought by puzzlesolvers are hidden by being obscured by the way in which a

situation is presented.
feature.

Popular riddles typically have this
Often it is possible to trace the source of difficulty

in paradox-yielding arguments to some obscurity in the meaning
of their constituent sentences.
It is this obscurity that

induces the initial affirmation of truth and deducibility,
when falsehood or nondeducibility is the case. Thus, we may
say that the source of paradoxicality in these cases is an

obscurity in the initial interpretation of the constituent
sentences.
Solutions in these cases are gotten by interpreting
the sentences in a way that reconciles the argument with our

intuitions about truth and deducibility.

That is, the

conclusions of the arguments turn out, under the interpretations,
to be

(1) or

(2), as defined in
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Aristotle, as we have seen, traces the
source of difficulty
10 t h6 Sophlsts
argument to an obscurity in the
meaning of
/
,
"tqutov" ("same"); and he solves the
puzzle by interpreting
(P') in such a way that it does not
imply the conclusion.
But it seems true to say that in
construing (P' as he does,
Aristotle misconceives the puzzle before him.
'

Prom our privileged vantage point it is easy
to see where
Aristotle went awry. In a word, he mislocated
the obscurity
in the presentation.
He took obscurity to reside in the
meaning
of "raurov," whereas it lay elsewhere.
It lay, as I prefer to
view the matter, in semantical peculiarities
of its referential

occurrences.

Obscurity in modes of presentation is effected
in various
ways, but in the case of puzzles of the kind
here being considered,
it is effected by having within the presentation
no sign

distinguishing one kind of referential occurrence
from another.
There are, on the one hand, standard referential
occurrences
and, on the other, nonstandard referential
occurrences. By
an expression's having "standard referential
occurrence" in
some context, I mean that the expression refers
and moreover

refers, in that context, in "the standard way." By an
expression's reterring in "the standard way," I mean that
the expression refers directly to its object. An expression
has standard referential occurrence in some context if
it
has what Frege calls "direct" (" gerade " ) occurrence 3 and
what Quine calls "purely referential occurrence."^ By an
,

expression

having "nonstandard referential occurrence" in
some context, I mean that the expression either does not
'

s

refer or does not refer, in that context, in the standard
way.
The problem posed by nonstandard referential occurrences
is that nonstandard referential occurrences are not always
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self-i ientifying.

An expression that has standard referential
occurrence, in one context, may not he, at first,
semantically
distinguishable from itself as it has, in some
other context,
a nonstandard referential occurrence.
Whence arises paradoxes
But this is not always the case. Any expression
occurring

within quotation marks is semantically distinguishable
from
itself as it occurs outside quotation marks.
We know that the

references of "nine" are not identical in the
sentences,
•'Nine is less than ten," and "'Nine* is the
name of a number;"
and we know that "nine" has a standard referential
occurrence
in the first sentence and a nonstandard referential
occurrence
in the second sentence.

There are obvious advantages to having within a language
the means for distinguishing standard from nonstandard
referential
occurrences. Moreover, natural languages do normally
possess
some procedure or other for making such distinctions,
when it
_is clear that the intended reference s are
distinct . Numbers
are clearly different from names, and so too are television

programs from Presidents.

But whereas we have a solid intuitive

criterion for telling when expressions have nonstandard referential
occurrence, it is an unsolved philosophical problem whether the
two occurrences of "Coriscus" in (p‘

have distinct references.

however, the expressions "Coriscus" and "the approaching
man" are taken to refer in their standard way everywhere in (P')>
If,

then there is no ambiguity about the references of these

expressions.

"Coriscus" refers everywhere in

and "the approaching man" refers everywhere in (P

approaching man.

to Coriscus,

(P'
1

)

to the

And, from all indications, this is how

Aristotle took the referring expressions in

(P'

to refer.

Aristotle had been led astray by construing (implicitly,
assume) the referring expressions in

standard way.

(P*

)

I

as referring in their

"I know ..." came thus to he viewed as expressing
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an attribute of one of the references
(Coriscus) and not an
attribute of the other (the approaching
man).

Aristotle
concluded that since Coriscus and the
approaching man are
discernible, they are not identical. The
reasoning is beyond
reproach, but the premise, we are inclined
to say, is false.
The discovery of nonstandard referential
occurrences
seems to be a rather late development
in the history of
philosophy. This is, however, not so
surprising when we
realize that only lately have philosophers
come to recognize
the great importance of language to
their proper concerns.
The philosophy of language, in the contemporary
sense of the

phrase, began with Frege; and in Frege’s
writings we find,
as far as I know, the first recognition that
puzzles like the
one in Sh_, c. 24, are due to the phenomenon
of nonstandard

referential occurrence.
In the following chapter I shall set forth some
of the
most influential of contemporary solutions to
puzzles like

that of Aristotle's.

The common property of all of these

puzzles is that they yield paradoxical conclusions,
if the
Indiscernibility of Identicals (il) is accepted as an

intuitively valid principle and hence a nondisavowable
principle. The validity of that principle is at issue
until such time as each paradox is discovered not to be
an antinomy.
Aristotle's solution to the Sophists' argument
did not, therefore, if my account is correct, settle the
issue of the validity of II . Aristotle's explanation

presumably relieved the situation of puzzlement, from
Aristotle's point of view; but in the sense of "philosophical
puzzle" characterized earlier, the philosophical puzzle
remains, since Aristotle's explanation is not a true

explanation
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Before proceeding to contemporary
solutions to puzzles
like that of Aristotle's, I want to
consider the question
whether Aristotle's puzzle belongs to this
collection.
Some
may contend that the Sophists' argument is
not a puzzle; that
there is simply no intelligible way of
construing (p*
such
that it is true.
I am not persuaded that this is so;
nor
do I see how one could give a conclusive
argument for the
claim.

One argument that will not do is that
the Sophists'
argument is not a puzzle that results from
nonstandard

referential occurrence, because expressions that
have
nonstandard referential occurrence always occur inside
subordinate sentences

.

Two objections to this argument

can be raised.

One is that the premise of the argument is
simply not true, for as is well known, quotation
forms a

singular term

within which a referring expression always
has nonstandard referential occurrence. The second objection
,

is that the argument presupposes that the grammatical
form

of (P') dictates its logical form (whereof more in
Chapter III)
But the correct analysis of the direct— object construction

"a knows b" may be such that "b" does occur inside a

subordinate sentence.

Jaakko Hintikka, for example,

analyzes "a knows b" as "(3x) a knows that

(b = x),"

where "(3x)" is interpreted as a quantifier relying on
a method of identification by acquaintance.^
I am inclined
to think that something like Hintikka'
I"t

s

analysis is correct.

is true that if we do not subscribe to an analysis of

"a knows b" in terms of "knows that

then (p

1

)

cannot be formulated in accordance with Russell's theory
of descriptions in any way that does not imply a contradiction,

given ordinary laws of quantification theory.^

That, of course

cannot be viewed as a conclusive reason for (P')'s having no
sense that is contingent and indeed could be viewed as
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evidence that a Hintikka-like analysis is
correct.
What seems undeniable to me is that Aristotle's

puzzlement
was occasioned by the same phenomenon that
would occasion
puzzlement in a contemporary, were that
contemporary presented
with the argument that
(P~) Coriscus = the approaching man.

Coriscus is musical.

Aristotle knows that

Aristotle does not know that

the approaching man is musical

implies
(C*)

Bx )( E y)(x

Aristotle knows that x is musical.
Aristotle does not know that
y is musical)
(

= y

.

shall speak of the argument from (p*) to
(c*) as "the Coriscus
puzzle." The Coriscus puzzle poses an initial threat
I

intuitive validity of

II_,

to the
just as (on present speculation) Aristotle

took the Sophists' argument to pose an initial threat
to the
intuitive validity of II
The Coriscus puzzle is free from
.

the difficulties connected with the Sophists' argument,
and
it is to the Coriscus puzzle that all contemporary
solutions

included in the following chapter apply.
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(For simplicity, "Coriscus" is taken to
be a proper name.)
Assume 3 a. Then:
.
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.

.

4 (y)(Ay = y = a)
5 a = c
6 Fa

.

a = c

7 (y)(Ay = y = a) .Fa
8 (Ex) J/ty)(Ay = y = x)

Assume

3 b.

4
5

Fx 7

contradicting 3a

Then:
(y)(Ay = y = a)
(y)(Ay = y = a)

6 Aa £ a = a
7 a = a

8

.

Assumption (l)

Aa

.

a = c

Assumption (l)
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9 a = c

10 Ac
•

12 \l]\Z I y : b)
13 Ac = c = b
14 c = b
15 ~Fb
16 ~Fc

~ Pb

Assumption (3b)

contradicting

2

CHAPTER THREE

THREE THEORIES OP NONSTANDARD REFERENTIAL
OCCURRENCE:
THE CONTEMPORARY WAY OUT
§ 1

Referring Expressions— Grammatical
Forms

Following Russell's account of a
"denoting phrase," 1 I call
an expression of a natural language
a "referring expression,"
solely in virtue of its form. However,
I follow more closely
Strawson's conception and division of
the forms that referring
expressions may take. 2 These are:
(l) pronouns
2
proper
.

(

)

nouns, and (3) des criptive phrases
(expressions beginning with
a definite article, followed
by a noun— common or proper—
qualified
or unqualified, in the singular).
I do not presume that every
referring expression has one of these three
forms but do presume
that every referring expression can be
translated, without loss
of meaning, into an expression having
one of these three forms
(for example, "Gray's Elegy " can be
translated into the
descriptive phrase, ’’the Elegy which is Gray's").
In addition,

follow Russell in distinguishing three
cases of referring expressions:
(l) those which have indefinite
I

or nonunique references,

(

2

)

those which have definite or

unique references, and (3) those which have no
references.
Pronouns, alone, are those referring expressions
which have
indefinite references. There are cases of referring
expressions
which have unique references among both proper nouns
and
descriptive phrases.

Finally, there are cases of referring

expressions which have no references among all three categories
of referring expressions.
In this chapter, reference to expressions that refer shall
be understood not to include reference to pronouns
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D_ef inite
^ 2

descri ptions and Other Nongrammatical Forms

In the preceding section, a referring
expression was defined
as an expression having a certain grammatical
form.

However,

reference

in the literature to the forms of
certain referring
expressions is not always reference to grammatical

forms.

Referring expressions have grammatical forms and
some other
kind of form (to which philosophers have apparently

not seen

fit to give a name).

When Russell speaks of the form of a definite
description
he means something other than what Strawson means
hy

,

the form

of a definite description.

Strawson holds that

a

definite

description is an expression "beginning with the definite
article followed by a noun, qualified or unqualified,

in the

singular (e.g.,

’the table',

'the old man',

'the king of France')."^

Definite descriptions are therefore expressions having a certain
grammatical form, according to Strawson's account.

Russell seems to imply that definite descriptions are
grammatical forms when he says that a definite description is
an expression of the form "the so-and-so," but Russell also

wants to say that a definite description is an "incomplete
symbol," an expression of the form r ( ?x) (tfx)"1 This last
.

form is not a grammatical form.

As Leonard Linsky observes,^

"the table," a definite description on Strawson's account,
is not necessarily a definite description on Russell's account;

and this is easily shown by taking the sentence (Linsky' s),
"The table is the most important item of furniture in the

dining room."

It would be an egregious error to symbolize

this sentence as "G(7x)Fx", for "G(7x)Fx" reads:

"There is

(exists) an x such that x is F, and for all y, if y is F,
then y is identical with x, and x is G; or, more simply:

"There is exactly one thing x which is F, and x is G."

But
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the sentence, "The

table is the most important
in the dining room," does not have
the meaning

„„

cf furnlture

of "There is

exactly one thing x which is a table,
and x is the most important
item of furniture in the dining room .'
1

In this thesis a definite description
will be understood
as an incomplete symbol, in Russell's
sense: an expression of
the form r (?x)(<£x)~\ A definite
description is therefore not
simply a grammatical form. Thus, a
descriptive phrase fas
defined in }l) is not necessarily a definite

description.

Russell's notion of a definite description
has semantical as
well as grammatical import. A definite
description has the
grammatical form of a descriptive phrase, but
one

and the same

descriptive phrase (for example,

''the table") may be a definite
description on one occasion of use and not a
definite description
on another.
So a definite description is defined,
in cart,
by usage. A definite description is a
descriptive phrase which

is used purportedly to refer to some

(nonintensional ) object,
Finally, a definite description is said to
have
no "meaning in isolation ," 5 no "significance on
its own account ." 6
some thing.

This last condition is at once the most difficult to
understand
and at the same time the most crucial to the
distinction
between definite descriptions and names
For, at least

.
in theory,
there are names which have the grammatical form of a
descriptive
phrase ('the morning star," perhaps), and names are
used
purportedly to refer to things. But only a name, according

to Russell, has meaning on its own account; that is,
in

isolation from any sentence in which it may occur. Thus,
a name, like a definite description, is not simply
a grammatical
form, but is an expression that satisfies certain semantical
conditions.

Thus, a proper noun (as defined in jl) is not

necessarily a name.
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am not concerned to explore the
intricacies of Russell's
notions of a definite description
and a name. What is important
for my concerns is that a definite
description is an incomplete
symbol, an expression of the form r
(7z)(<J*J\ and that a name
is not an incomplete symbol,
but an expression of some
other
nongrammatical form. What is important
for my concerns is
Russell's analysis of sentences containing
referring expressions
For the distinctions in the analyses
of these sentences may
be viewed as corresponding to the
distinctions in the ways
in which the referring expressions
refer in the sentences,
according to Russell's theory.
I

§ 3

Names

Although both names and definite descriptions
may have
unique references, names and definite
descriptions never refer
in the same way, according to Russell's
theory.
In Russell's
theory, every name refers in what

I

am calling the "standard-

^very occurrence of a name is a "standard
referential
occurrence." In other theories of reference that

way.

we shall
discuss, it is not true that every occurrence of
a name (in
the theory) is a standard referential
occurrence. Nevertheless,
the general idea of a name is the same in each
of these theories

Russell says that a name is "a simple symbol, directly
designating an individual which is its meaning, and having
this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings
of all other words."
I shall disregard everything in this
statement except the claim that a name is a simple symbol.

Unless a referring expression is a simple symbol, Russell
tells us, it cannot occur as the "subject" of any "logical
form": a sentence resulting from semantical analysis (the

notion of logical form is explored more fully in
^4).
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I shall

assume (apparently along with
Russell) that every
referring expression (pronouns included)
Is either a "simple"
symbol or an incomplete symbol,
In his sense.
I shall then
define a ’'name" as follows:
(Def. 1)

A referring expression a is a
name in a language L,
if and only if ( 1
in L, a unique reference,
) a has,
and (2) a. is not an incomplete
symbol in L

(bef. 1) adequately defines a name
in every theory of reference—
or, every language L prescribed
by that theory— discussed on
these

pages.

Relativization of namehood to a language
is necessary,
since one and the same referring expression
may be an incomplete
symbol in one language and not an
incomplete symbol in another.
"Conscus" and "the approaching man" will be names
in one

language and not names in another.
We must still distinguish standard
referential occurrences
of names from nonstandard referential
occurrences of names.
We must do so, that is, if we are to describe
adequately those
theories that (1) construe every referring
expression

which
has a unique reference as a "simple" symbol and
hence a name,
and (2) account for the Coriscus puzzle and
other puzzles of
that ilk in a way that does not conflict with
our intuition
that II is intuitively valid.

One method is to distinguish

occurrences of the same name; another is to distinguish
some
name s from others.
In this section I shall consider the
second method only.
In some, but not all,

theories that countenance nonstandard

referential occurrence on the part of names, some names are
singled out as always referring in the standard way. That is,
for any occurrence of the name in any sentence of the language
prescribed by that theory, that occurrence is a standard referential
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occurrence.

It would be congenial to
call names that always

refer in the standard way, according
to some theory,
-standard
names;- but this term has a
technical meaning not congenial
to
the distinction between
standard and nonstandard
referential
occurrences. If one imagines a
language of mixed modalities
(necessity and belief contexts, for
example), then a standard
name may refer in the standard
way on one occasion (in
contexts
of necessity) but not on
another (in contexts of belief).
I might follow an old custom
and call names that always
refer
in the standard way, according
to some theory, -logically
proper names;- but this term, too,
seems
to have a technical

meaning not altogether congenial to
the distinction between
standard and nonstandard referential
occurrences.
It is

generally used to designate a referring
expression open to
substitution and generalization (roughly
speaking) and to

distinguish these referring expressions
from others which
are not.
But, in Frege's theory, names which
do not

refer

directly to their objects

— hence,

names which do not refer
the standard way— nevertheless must
be said to be open
to substitution and generalization,
once disambiguation has
been effected. I propose -standard proper
name- as a
designation of names which, according to

m

some theory,

always refer in the standard way. Thus,
every name, in
Russell's theory, is a standard proper name.

My use of the term "standard proper name- will
be
limited. Not every theory of reference discussed
in this
thesis countenances the existence of such names.
logical behavior displayed by such names is the

But the

criterion
of standard referential occurrence and consequently
is of

great importance.

What this logical behavior consists in
I am not yet prepared to state with any exactness.
However,

for the present, a standard proper name may be defined
as
f ollows
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(Bef

.

2)

A referring expression a is
a standard proper
name in a language L, if
and only if (1) a is
a name in L, and
(2) for any occurrence of a
in any sentence of L,
that occurrence
is a

standard referential occurrence
in L
Like namehood, standard
proper namehood must be
relativised
to a language; for one and
the same referring expression
may be
a standard proper name
in one language and not a
standard proper
name in another.
'.Nine" will be a standard
proper name in one
language and not a standard proper
name in another.

J

4 Logical Form;

In "On Denoting," Russell says:
If I say

'Scott was a man,' that is a statement
of the
form *x was a man
and it has Scott for its
sub;ject<
But if I say the author of Steve r ley
was a man,' that
is not a statement of the form
*x was a man,' and does
not have 'the author of Waver ley
for its subject.
.

,

'

The distinction that Russell makes here
is one between what
he calls the "logical forms" of sentences
containing names
(that is, standard proper names) and sentences
containing

definite descriptions.
forms are best thought of as sentences
of a
formal language, which sentences are interpreted
by a semantical
theory in the desired way (the way desired by,
for example,
a theory of reference).

Now Russell's examples of logical

forms are not sentences of any formal language, but
I have
not said that what is best thought of as a logical
form is
what Russell meant by

a

logical form.

Still, his example

of the logical form (in his sense) of an English
sentence

containing a standard proper name will serve as a prototype
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Of the logical form (in our
sense) of an English
sentence
containing a standard proper name.

Logical forms are creatures of
semantical analysis.
In particular, theories of
reference are concerned with
the
semantical analysis of occurrences
of referring expressions
within certain English arguments
and with the manner in
which
these occurrences are to be
represented within -argument forms"
(orderings of logical forms), where
the question of the validity
of these English arguments
are to be decided by the
theory.
The manner in which these occurrences
are to be represented
formally must therefore be determined
by the way in which the
resulting syntax is interpreted by the
semantics of the theory.
Every theory of reference being discussed
here prescribes some
measure of syntax and semantics, and
I shall assume that a
complete and consistent formal language
is constructable
within which each theory can display
its logical forms.
For the reason that analysis of "was a
man" is not
germane to his ends, presumably, Russell
leaves "was a man"
unanalyzed. But, in another theory of
reference, some
occurrences of referring expressions may be
analyzed as parts
of complex and indissoluble predicates
"This means viewing
'Tom believes /Cicero denounced CatilineJ'
:

...

form

'

Fa

*

with

a.

as of the

= Tom and complex 'F'."^

Each theory of reference discussed on these
pages
prescribes nonequivalent logical forms of the same
English
sentences under analysis. These logical forms are
not,
in general,

sentences even of the same formal language.
Some, of these logical forms can be reformulated
as sentences
of some standard form of lower predicate calculus
with

identity (hereafter, "LPC+IT"), to whose basis something
or other may be added.
For example, both of the forms

mentioned above

— "x

was a man" and "Fa"

— can

be reformulated
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within some standard form of LPC+IT
as "Fx"
Discussion of these various theories
would be facilitated
if we could settle on one formal
language within which each
theory could be said to display the
logical forms of its
analyses. This is not possible,
however, for some theories
prescribe formal languages with
quantification over individual
variables only, and others prescribe
formal languages with
quantification over other variables as
well. Nevertheless,
some form of a language with
quantification over individual
variables may be viewed as a part of, if
not

the whole of,
the primitive basis of each of these
languages. In the
paragraph below, I partially construct
such a system, which
will be called "L " . The superscript "1"
signifies that
the language is a functional calculus
of first order.
I shall
represent by "L 1 (+...)" a formal language
which contains,

possibly, some addition to the basis L 1
.
Thus,
is ambiguous among various formal
languages,

M

1

L (+...)»

one of which

is

L.

shall be viewed as consisting of the following
primitive symbols:
sentence letters: "u". "c"
L

7

individual variables:

"x", "y»,

symbols:

"F", "G", "H"

m = i»

uj_

(read

,

"

z ",

'‘ij

-*•

J

•

•

• y

...; predicate

...; a dyadic predicate symbol:

identical with"); and any adequate set of
symbols in addition to the above (for example,
" v"
"E",
The language contains some standard set
s

»

for formation rules.

modus ponens, or
(-0

=

variables and

MP.,

(oc

Z.
Cc

The language contains the rule of
and the following theorem schemata:

and

ft

^

^)~\ where x and ^ are any individual

are any wffs, and

that in one or more places where

Qt

y.

and

has free x,

differ only in

ft
ft

has free

£
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(E)

Ct

variables and

D

(Ex)/?

Ot

and

(3

,

Where x and

£

are any individual

are any rtfs, and

in that in one or more places
where

Ct

a

and

0

differ only

has free

£ 0 has fre e x
Sentence letters and predicate
s^bols are left uninterpreted.
These may be interpreted by
one theory as propositional
and
predicate variables, in which case
a functional calculus
of
second order, having L as its
basis, will remove the
restriction
the formation rule of L 1
,

m

:

If

Of

is a wff

is a wff

,

and x is any individual
variable, then r (T?x)oP

to read:
If

Or

is a wff, and v is any
variable,

then r (Ev)o? is a wff

In the

(unlikely) case of theories
prescribing second-order calculi
for which sentence letters and
predicate symbols are not variables,
the primitive basis L is augmented
to include variables other
than individual variables.

Since "L (+...)" is any formal language
having L 1 as its
primitive basis, L (+...) may be a
functional calculus of
second or higher order. L 1 + ...) may
be extensional
(
or

intensional, depending upon the criterion
thereof.
When we speak of a theory's analyzing some
English sentence,
analysis will be thought of as consisting,
in part, in the

reformulation of that English sentence as some
sentence of
L (+...).
But the result is not yet a logical form;
for a
logical form is not simply a syntactic form, any
more than
a definite description is a grammatical
form.
Logical forms
are j- n ter Pre ted sentences of a formal language
The
-

.

interpretational element in analysis will be thought
of
1
as consisting in valuation assignments to sentences
of L (+...).
The semantics prescribed by a theory of reference
will
be
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thought of as one which interprets
sentences of L 1 (+ '
1
defines validity for T ^.
'

'

)

' '

and

Unless indicated to the contrary,
reference to a language
L, prescribed by some theory
of reference, is reference
to
L
together with rules for
interpreting, and defining
validity within, L (+...)• So
conceived, a theory of reference
can decide the question whether
certain English arguments are
valid or not.
It is best to think of a theory
of reference in this way,
but no effort need be made to
construct a

formal language,
together with a semantics, for each
theory.
For the modest
purposes of this study, it is sufficient
to assume as
incorporated within each theory of
reference a semantics
that validates in L 1 (+...), MP,

$ 5 Logical

(i), and (e).

Forms in Russell’s Theory

Thus, I revise, slightly, Russell's
depiction of the
logical form of "Scott was a man" to read
"Fx" .
(Although
it will presumably not be so treated
generally, in "On
Denoting," "Scott" is treated as a name.)
Now we wish to
know what the logical form of "the author
of Naverley was
a man" is.

It is not "Fx"

according to Russell's statement,
and it must not be if Russell is to
solve the following
"puzzle about George IV'

s

,

curiosity":

A. Scott = the author of V aver ley
B. George IV wished to know whether Scott
was the author

of Waverley
C.

George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott

Now this puzzle is certainly a puzzle that threatens
the

validity of II.

For

C

seems at first to follow from A and B,
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given the principle that if * and
y are identical, then every
attribute of x is an attribute of
y (the attribute in question
being that of being wondered by
George 17 whether x as Soott).
But under the E ost natural
interpretation of these sentences,
A and B are true, while
C is false.
But if "the author of

—— rle y

"

ls a name

then the argument form of A
through C
corresponds, in L (+...), to a logical
form which is an instance
of (I).
Now we may agree that one has
failed to show that
is
not
invalid, from an intuitive point
21
of view, if one
;

.

»

admits instances of (l) that are
false under some interpretation.
Therefore, since Russell is concerned
to defend the validity
of LI» Russell must argue that
"the author of Haver lev " is
not a name
Russell does have an argument for
the proposition that
-the author of Waverley" is not a
name. This ar^ment, which
l0
occurs in Princioia Mathematica
.oes as follows: Assume
that "the author of Waverley" is
a name.
Then the sentence
•'Scott = the author of Wayerley " has
the logical form "x = y<*.
Then either "Scott = the author of
Waver ley "
,

is false or,

if true, tautological.

But "Scott = the author of Waverley "
is neither false nor tautological.
Therefore, "the author
of Waverley

is not a name.

A modal logician might express

essentially the same intuition hy saying that
"Scott = the
author of Waverley" is necessarily true, if
true, given that
both referring expressions are standard
proper names.
In
so asserting, the modal logician appeals
to the following
theorem, valid in most modal logics: "x
= y D N(x — y)"
(where "N" is an operator which reads "it is
necessary that").

Russell purports to prove not only that "the author
of
Waverley" is not a name, but that "the author of
Waverley "
is an incomplete symbol, a symbol which has
no meaning on
its own account.

That argument goes as follows:

Since
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author of Waver ley " is not a name,
then it means nothing;
for if it meant anything it would
mean Scott. But the preceding
argument proves that -the author of
jjaverley " cannot mean Scott.
Therefore, -the author of Waver ley”
is an incomplete symbol.
This proof assumes that if a referring
expression means
anything on its own account, then it
means what is directly
referred to by the expression. But
this is a disavowable
assumption and is in fact disavowed
within Frege's theory
of reference.
Moreover, that a referring expression
means
nothing on its own account still does not
'•the

imply that the

expression is to be analyzed as r (?x)(^x)'
Quine's theory
.
of reference shares the premise that
a referring expression
which does not refer in the standard way
has no meaning
1

in

isolation, but Quine does not analyze such
expressions as
incomplete symbols, symbols of the form r
(7x)(0x)"
Some of the premises of Bussell's theory may
be questioned,
but these premises differ in an important way
from the premise,
1

.

crucial to Aristotle's solution— that things
are not identical
if they are the same in number accidentally
in not being
counterintuitive; and we may view as a strong argument
in its

—

favor (if not the strongest argument in its favor)
that Russell's
theory offers a satisfactory way of solving
puzzles of the
kind under consideration.
Since no definite description is a simple (or we
might
say, "complete") symbol, it must not be
symbolized by a simple
(or "complete") symbol x.
But individual variables are the

only individual symbols in L 1

.

According to Russell's theory, every definite description
is an incomplete symbol, to be defined in the sentential
context
in which it occurs and thereupon eliminated.

The result of

contextual definition (which goes on at the level of analysis)
is a sentence in primitive notation of L 1 where the burden
of
,
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reference is put on bound variables of a
complex logical form.
One may, if one wishes, symbolize a
definite description, or
incomplete symbol of English, by a similarly
incomplete symbol
of formal notation.
1
One may introduce into L
an idiom for

this purpose

"7

with which to form a "description
operator"(?x)'.
Then every definite description is
symbolizable by
some expression of the form r
(?x)(<£xF, which may be read r the
1
£ that is#"’. Let "ll+ 7
stani for L with the addition of
this new notation, together with definitions
for eliminating
(lx) ( PxJ from atomic formulas and identity
sentences. Thus,
"the author of Waver ley was a man" can now
be seen to have the
logical form of "F(7x)Gx" in lVj-. But this
last sentence
"

'

<

]

1
is def initicnally equivalent to the sentence,
in L
"(Ex)((y)(Gy = y = x) . Fx)."

5 6 The Logical
S tandard

Russell

,

Form of Sentences Containing

Referential Occurrences

"x was a man" served as our prototype of the
logical form of sentences containing standard proper names.
'

s

But it serves, a fortiori, as the prototype of the logical
form of sentences containing standard referential occurrences
in Russell's language

For all and only standard proper names

.

refer in the standard way in the language.

All and only

standard proper names directly designate their objects.
Thus, we can say that, within Russell's language, an expression
a

refers in the standard way in a sentence

the logical form of

uc

is a sentence

free individual variable
in

(X

_x

replacing

of L
a.,

<*,
(

if and only if

+ ...), with some

wherever a occurs

.

The above bicondition holds for all languages, like Russell's,
in which expressions that refer in the standard way are certain
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kinds of expressions.

But we can obtain, for our ends,
a

completely general characterization of
the logical form
of sentences containing expressions
that refer in
the

standard way, in terms of occurrences
of these referring
expressions. By a "completely general
characterization,"
I mean that the bicondition holds
for all languages prescribed
by theories of reference discussed on

these pages.
Let
"a standard referential occurrence"
abbreviate "an occurrence
of a referring expression that
refers in the standard way."
Then we can say that

(SRO)

An occurrence of an expression a in a
sentence
Oc is a standard referential
occurrence in a

language L, if and only if the logical
form of
Of is a sentence
of L* ( + ...), with some free

individual variable x replacing that occurrence
of

_a

(SRO) characterizes standard referential occurrence
within:

languages in which expressions that refer in the
standard
way are any names (see (Def. 1)) that fulfill certain
conditions
of occurrence (cl. Frege's notion of ordinary
( gewohnlich )
(a)

occurrence and Quine’s notion of purely referential
occurrence);
as well as (b) languages in which expressions
that refer
in

the standard way are special kinds of referring
expressions
(namely, standard proper names) (for any occurrence of
a

standard proper name is a standard referential occurrence).
!£ke

Logical Behavior of Standard Referential Occurrences

We may now turn our attention to the topic, briefly
touched in §3, of the logical behavior that characterizes,

and is a criterion of, standard referential occurrence.
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This behavior may be defined in
terms of the validity of
two
inferences
Ve can ex istentially generalize
on any expression which
has standard referential
occurrence in any sentence of
L.
That
is, we can validly infer
fro. any sentence Of, containing
one
or more standard referential
occurrences of some expression
a,
the sentence r (Sx)^,

where § differs from * in
containing
an occurrence of a free individual
variable x in place of any
standard referential occurrence of
a in a.
This is confirmed
as follows: By (SHO), the logical
f orm y of of contains free
£ in place of every standard referential occurrence of a
in a.
But, by (E)xMP, we can obtain
r
from y the sentence
(Ex) 6 n
where 6 differs from
y in containing free x wherever y contains
free Z . But, as noted
(§4), (S) and MP are valid in L.
We can substitute for any expression
which has standard
referential occurrence in any sentence of
L any other expression
which would have standard referential
occurrence in that sentence
and which is related to the first
expression by a sign of identity
But the substituted expression would have
standard referential
occurrence in the original sentence if it has
standard referential
,

occurrence in the identity sentence. That
is, if two expressions
a and b have standard referential
occurrence in the sentence
r a = b"
and some sentence Od contains one or more
standard
referential occurrences of the expression a, then
we can
"
validly infer from r a = b and Od the sentence
£, where (3
differs from Oc in containing an occurrence of the
expression
1

,

1

in place of any standard referential occurrence
of a in
This is confirmed as follows: By (SRO), the logical

—

Oc.

form

of

a_

= b

is r x =

Z

n

and the logical form

y of oc contains
free x in place of every standard referential occurrence
of
in
Oc.
r
But,
by
n
(i)xMP, we can obtain from x = y and
!L
y
the sentence 6, where 5 differs from
y in containing free
,

z

wherever y contains free
are valid in L.

x.

But, as noted ({4),

(i) and MP

.
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§8 N o nstandard

Ref e rential Occurrence in
Russell-s Theory

The characterization (SRO) of
the logical form of sentences
containing standard referential
occurrences will do for every
theory of reference considered on
these pages. What differs,
among these theories, is the logical
form of sentences whose
referential occurrences are not standard
referential occurrences
By a "nonstandard referential
occurrence," it is meant an
occurrence of a referring expression
that does not refer in
the standard way. Thus, any
occurrence of a nondenoting
referring expression (like -Pegasus") is
a nonstandard referential
occurrence. The more interesting cases,
however, are those
involving referring expressions which have
unique references
but whose occurrences are nevertheless
nonstandard referential
occurrences.
We can generalize on Russell's theory
of nonstandard

referential occurrence as follows:

If a is any referring

expression which has a unique reference, but
is not a standard
proper name, then either a is a definite
description, or a is
tr anslatable into a definite description
(for

example, "Bismarck"
might be translated into "the first chancellor
of the German
Empire"). Then a is of the form r
(ix)faV, and no expression
of this form directly designates its object;
hence, no

expression of this form refers in the standard way.
any occurrence of a is a nonstandard referential

Then

occurrence.

Then nonstandard referential occurrence within Russell's
language (L^) may be characterized as follows:
(NRO

r)

An occurrence of an expression a in a sentence
(X

is a nonstandard referential occurrence in L^,

if and only if the
(3 of L
r (7x)

•*•"?"

far

(

+ •••)

logical form of

Oc

is a sentence

with some incomplete symbol

replacing that occurrence of a
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Note that L +"?» contains no
non-truth-functional operators
But puzzles involving nonstandard
referential occurrence often
involve modalities (in the broad
sense), and formalizations
of
these puzzles, in Russell's
contemplated lan^age, will require
the introduction into L +")'•
of certain non-truth-functional
operators. Thus the necessity of
relativizing 3 , in (NRO
(
R ),
to I/V’7" (+...).
In general,

languages under study here are
understood
to be languages equipped to represent,
formally, an£ nonstandard
referential occurrence in the natural
language.
I„ some of
these languages, contexts of necessity,
belief, and other
modalities give rise to nonstandard referential
occurrence.
These languages will therefore be understood
to be languages
of mixed modalities, however differently
these contexts are
formally represented in the languages.
$ 9 Nonstandard Referential Occurrence in Fre ge

’

s

Theory

Much of what has been said here had been
anticipated by
Gottlob Frege. In "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung, 1,11
Frege dealt
with puzzles like some of those dealt with
by Russell

in "On
Denoting" (Russell's theory of descriptions
solves other puzzles
besides those under consideration here) and
had anticipated

the

distinction between standard and nonstandard
referential
occurrence. However, in Frege’s theory, every
referring

expression which has a unique reference is construed
as a

'

simple" symbol; that is, not an incomplete symbol,
in
Russell's sense. These referring expressions are therefore

names (by (Lef. l)).
But in Frege's theory, also, referring expressions
take
more grammatical forms than those listed in {l, and a name

may be a referring expression having some grammatical form
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not listed in §1.

For example, “died in misery" and
"Kepler
died in misery" are both names, according
to the theory.

Interest in this thesis is however restricted
to referring
expressions having the grammatical forms
listed in §1.
Subsequent reference to names will therefore
be understood
to be reference to a subset of names,
within Frege's theory.
But if Frege were to analyze every
sentence containing
a name a fa "simple" symbol) as
a sentence of L 1 (+...) containing
a free

individual variable x (a "simple" symbol)
in place thereof,
then Frege would encounter the same difficulty
we discussed
above in connection with the puzzle about
George IV 's curiosity.
But it is an error of analysis, according to
Frege's
theory, to represent every occurrence of a
name a in every

context by a free individual variable x; for the
result
implies no distinction in the values of x in its
several
occurrences, and it is precisely diversity of reference
of
one and the same name in some of its occurrences
that
accounts for nonstandard referential occurrence.

That an occurrence is a nonstandard referential occurrence
is decidable, in Frege's theory, by the "substitutivity
criterion.

That is, we can tell that a name has a nonstandard
referential occurrence in a context if the name is not
'

amenable to valid substitution, in accordance with the
pattern
of inference described in §7.
But Frege explains failures
of substitution by theorizing that the names being substituted

have diverse references.

A name refers in the standard way,

because it refers directly to some given object; and in a
nonstandard way, because it refers indirectly to that object
and directly to another object which is related in an interesting

way to the first-mentioned object.
Thus, as we see, whether it refers in the standard way
or in a nonstandard way in some context, a name is "directly

referential," or in David Kaplan's less ambiguous phrase,
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"fully referential

it has one reference (and
sense) in
its ordinary or direct (grade)
occurrence, and another
reference (and sense) in its "oblique"
or indirect (ungerade
occurrence

That a name does in truth shift
reference when its
occurrence shifts from substitutive
to nonsubstitutive
positions in a sentence can scarcely
be sustained by conclusive
argument. But, like Russell's
"proof" that "the author of
"
W aver le^ is an incomplete symbol,
Frege's theory (the details
of which I omit) is sustained by
premises, none of which are
counterintuitive; and we may view as a strong
argument in its
favor (if not the strongest argument
in its favor) that

Frege's theory offers a satisfactory way
of solving puzzles
of the kind under consideration.
A method of distinguishing,

syntactically, nonstandard
from standard referential occurrences may
he accomplished by
1
subscripting individual variables of L
Let the variables,
"x", "y", "z", ..., range over objects
referred to by names,
.

whenever these names refer in the standard way; and
the
variables, "x ', "y " , "z
..., range over objects referred
£
(
£
to by names, whenever these names refer in
a nonstandard way.
xl

"

'»

1

"

z

i"’

•••>

shall be thought of as media of indirect

reference to the values of "x", "y", ” z ", ...,
respectively.
I shall not concern myself with specifying values
for

subscripted variables; nor, therefore, with specifying
a relation between the values of "x" and "x "
"y" and "y ",
t
and so on, beyond that of nonidentity . Objects of reference
in oblique contexts have been variously taken to be
individual

concepts, customary senses of referring expressions, and
referring expressions themselves.
The same subscripts may be attached to "p"
"P "

"G” ,

"H**

,

...,

,

”q", "r",

resulting in two sets of sentence and

...,
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predicate va riables

corresponding to the contemplated
distinction
in the references of sentences and
predicates in their standard
and. nonstandard referential
occurrences.
Let "L^ + t '(+... )»
1
stand for L
with the addition of this new notation,
together
with any primitive symbols, rules of
formation, rules of inference,
and axioms, necessary and sufficient to
formalize Pregean analyses!
Then nonstandard referential occurrence
within a Pregean language
(Lp) may be characterized as follows:
,

,

(NRO

An occurrence of an expression a in a
sentence
is
a.
Gi
nonstandard referential occurrence in L^,

f)

if and only if the logical form of
(3

OC

is a sentence

°f L +"£" (+...), with some free
individual

variable x
where
a in

^

ft

OC,

replacing that occurrence of a,
contains, in place of any occurrence of
either x or x

Nonstandard Referential Occurrence in Quine

'

s

Theory

In his reflections on nonstandard referential
occurrence,

Quine follows Frege in construing referring expressions which
have unique references as names.
Names are treated provisionally
as expressions open to substitution and existential
generalization,
as described in §7.
Both Frege and Quine use one or both of these
inferences as a criterion or criteria of nonstandard referential

occurrence.

Failure of substitution implies, in Quine's theory
as well as rrege's, that the name being supplanted does not
serve,
in the context in which it occurs,

to refer directly to its object.

Quine calls nonsubstitutive contexts "opaque" contexts.

That

it is an error of analysis to represent occurrences of names
within

such contexts by a free individual variable x is held, by both
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Frege and Quine, to be a
consequence of the fact that
the name
does not serve, in that context,
tc refer to anything;
hence,
the value of a variable x.
Frege marshals objects
other than
things for names to refer to on
these occasions. Failure
of substitution therefore
implies, in Frege's theory,
that
the names being substituted
have diverse references;
thus
we have not substituted names
of identicals .
But Quine
countenances no shifts of reference
on these occasions and
concludes that we cannot always
substitute names of identicals.
On what appears to be the considered
view of Quine, the
logical form of any English sentence
« containing a name a
which does not refer in the standard
way is a sentence which
contains no individual symbol in
place of a. The logical form
that « has will depend upon what
Oc says.
But there are two
general cases; Sometimes a will be
replaced, along with the
balance of its containing phrase (when
that phrase is any

context of propositional attitude for
example, "believes
that ...") by a one-place predicate
symbol F. 13 Sometimes
a Will be replaced along with the
balance of its containing
sentence (when that sentence is qualified by
any alethic
;

modal ity ;^f or example, "necessarily") by a
name of that
sentence.
In short, names that do not refer
in the
standard way in sentences are analyzed as parts of
complex
and indissoluble general terms or names. They
are "orthographic
accidents," in Quine's phrase. Sentences of the
first variety
1
are formalizable in L
that is, ordinary LPC+IT. The syntactic
;

interpretation of sentences of the form Necessarily,
1
and
CC*
-1
r Possibly
yields logical forms suitable as formulas within
OC
a syntactic treatment of modalities (as, for example,
that
,

contained in Carnap's Logical Syntax of Lan.-ma^e 1 )
However, what is common to the logical forms of all
sentences containing names which do not refer in the standard
*^
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way is the absence, within these forms,
of any media of reference
in any expression that replaces
those names.

Whereas occurrences

of definite descriptions are
eliminated in exchange for a string

of quantifiers and variables, occurrences
of names in opaque
contexts are absorbed and thus
effectively eliminated. The
nonref erential feature of these occurrences
is conveyed by the

following characterisation of nonstandard
referential occurrence
in Quine's language (
L )
Q

(1®0

Q

)

An occurrence of an expression a in
a sentence
a
^
nons i a n lard referential occurrence

in L
if and only if the logical form of
06 is a sentence
°f
L (+•••) such that, for any
^
,

expression A
which replaces that occurrence of a, the
inference
from (3 to r (Ex)>n is invalid in L^, where

y

differs from

variable

ft

in containing a free individual

in place

_x

of A.

In Quine's analogy, A is like "cat" in
"cattle."

$ 11 The Way Out

Most of the groundwork having been laid, I now
sketch
Russell's, Frege's, and Quine's solutions to the puzzles

threatening the validity of II.
the consequence that

If any of these puzzles has

is intuitively invalid,

then it has
the consequence that it is possible that some individual
x
and some individual y are identical, and x has an attribute

which y lacks.

The theorist endeavors to disprove this

consequence, indirectly, by arguing, directly, that none of
these puzzles has the consequence that (i) is intuitively

invalid in a language in which these puzzles are clearly
formulated. I now elaborate.
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Each theory locates the obscurity
in the puzzles in
semantical peculiarities of certain
occurrences of referring
expressions in their constituent
sentences, and each theory
is hound to diagnose this obscurity
as a ease of nonstandard
referential occurrence. For suppose
one of these theories
assumes that every referring
expression refers

in the standard

way (has standard referential occurrence)

in these sentences.
Then, by (SBO), every referring
expression in these sentences
is replaced by a free individual
variable in the logical forms
of these sentences. Then logical forms
of contingent sentences
will turn out to be either instances
of, or negations of instances
of, (I) in L (+...).
This results in an inconsistency of
interpretation, for it will be recalled that
every theory is
assumed to incorporate a semantics that
validates (i) in L 1

(+...).

Let me illustrate.

Reverting to the Coriscus puzzle
(Chapter II, ^5), suppose the theory assumes
that "Coriscus"
and "the approaching man" refer in the standard
way everywhere
in (P^-). Then (P-) has a logical form
equivalent to the denial
of an instance of (i) in any language
suitably equipped to
formulate (P*). For an instance of (i) in L 1 to
which the
,
operator "K" (read "knows that") is added, is

x = y

(1)

O

Fx

(K
z

D

K Fy)
z

But (P*), on the present assumption, has the logical form
x = y

(2)

m

.

(K

z

Fx

.

~K Fy)
z

1

L +"K" (+•••), and (2) contradicts (l).

Although the semantics
assigns "false" to (2)» (2) is the analysis of a contingent
sentence; hence, a sentence that is possibly true. The theory
therefore fails to prove that the Coriscus puzzle does not have
the consequence that (i) is intuitively valid in L 1 +"K" +
...)
(

and the theory fails to show that the Coriscus puzzle does not
violate II.
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Similarly, operating with a version of
the original
George IV puzzle, it is seen that the
argument form of this
puzzle corresponds to the logical form
(3)

x = y

D

(~K (x = y)
z

D -Kjx

= x))

in L +"K" (+...),

if "Scott" and "the author of
Waver ley"
are assumed by the theory to refer in
the standard

way.
But (3) is an instance of (I) in L X +"K"
(+...) . Hence,
the semantics assigns "true" to
Yet ( 3 ) is the
(3).
analysis of a contingent sentence; hence, a
sentence that
is possibly false.

Thus, once again the theory fails to
prove that (i) is not intuitively invalid in the
language

and thereby fails to prove that the George IV
puzzle does
not violate II .
But it is obvious that insofar as (p*) is a contingent
sentence, the context "Aristotle knows that ... is
musical"
is one which,

on Frege's and Quine's analyses,

is not open

to valid substitutions of names within its blanks,

in accordance
with the mode of inference described in 7 . The context is
§
therefore oblique, in Frege's terms; opaque, in Quine's.
Similarly, George IV wished to know whether Scott was ..."

is an oblique/opaque context,

the argument from A to C.

in view of the invalidity of

Frege's and Quine's solutions

can be seen very quickly.

The logical form of (p*), in Lp, is
x = y

(K z(Fl x l

~Kz(F{ yt )), where "K" is a dyadic
relation, to be read "knows"
(4)

•

)

which is not the negation of an instance of (i) and of course
does not imply (C ,c ), since ( 4 ) lacks the recurrence of "x" and
"y” within and without the oblique context.
a falsidical paradox.

(c*) is therefore

Similarly, the logical form, in Lp, of
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the George IV puzzle is
(5)

x = y

D

(~Kz(x,

=

yt

)

D

~Kz(x t =

Xf

)

which is not an instance of (i),
and its corresponding
argument form is invalid in the language.
The conclusion
C is therefore a falsidical
paradox as well.
Since both the Coriscus puzzle and
the George IV puzzle
involve contexts of propositional
attitude, they are analyzed
by Quine as sentences of ordinary
LPC+IT. The logical form
of (P*),

in L

Q
(6)

x = y

.

,

(Fz

is
.

~Gz

which is not the negation of an instance
of (i) and of course
doeo not imply (C-*), since (6) lacks the
recurrence of ”x" and
y within and without the opaque context.
(c*) is
therefore

a falsidical paradox.

Similarly, the logical form, in L

the George IV puzzle is
(7)

D

x = y

(F Z

^

,

of

D Gz)

which is not an instance of (I), and its corresponding
argument
form is of course invalid in the language. The
conclusion
C is therefore a falsidical paradox as
well.
We can generalize:

formula:

For Frege and Quine there is a simple
if a position in a sentence is nonsubstitutive
then
,

the occurrence of any referring expression in that
position is
a nonstandard referential occurrence.

Then that occurrence is

diagnosed as an occurrence of an ambiguity (Frege); an orthographic
accident (Quine). Then analysis yields a logical form in which
the occurrence is disambiguated (Frege); eliminated by absorption
(Quine).

All puzzles threatening the validity of II can be
shewn, by these methods, to nave falsidical paradoxes as

conclusions
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Russell's solution is more complicated
than Frege's
and Quine's. As a standard
referential occurrence his been
characterized, any occurrence of a
definite description is
a nonstandard referential
occurrence. But it is not
sufficient
to have determined that "the
approaching man" and "the author
of W aver ley ," in the Coriscus
and George IV puzzles, are
definite descriptions, to have proved
their conclusions
falsidical .
In a word, the obscurity in the
puzzles is not
removed, once we have diagnosed that
obscurity simply as
an occurrence of an ambiguity
(as in Frege's case) or a
sentence fragment (as in Quine's case).
Russell's
definite description, or incomplete
symbol, is a sentence
fragment, but one whose occurrence still
requires, sometimes,
a kind of disambiguation before
we have the completed
logical form.
In particular, disambiguation of
what is
called "scope" of the description is
necessary, whenever
a definite description occurs within
the scope of any
sentence operator, truth-functional or
otherwise. But every
puzzle threatening the validity of II contains
a non-truth-

functional operator, on Russellian analysis.
To illustrate scope ambiguity, take the
sentence
(8)

It is false that the present queen of Denmark
is bald

We may avoid theoretical difficulties about whether
"the
present queen of Denmark" is a name or description by
simply

regarding all referring expressions, other than pronouns,
as definite descriptions (hidden or unhidden). Then
"the
present queen of Denmark" is replaced, on analysis, by
an
incomplete symbol "(?x)Fx".

Eut we cannot formulate the

proposition expressed by (8), for there are at least two
propositions expressed by (8); namely, those expressed by
(9)

It is false that there is exactly one queen of Denmark

and she is bald
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and

There Is exactly one queen of
Denmark and she is not bald
If contextual definition of 8
results in an existential
(
)
sentence (of. ( 10 )), then the
description, "the present queen
of Denmark," is said to have
primary occurrence
(10)

,

12221. in

(

o ccurrence

,

8 ); otherwise

(of.

be formulated,

it is said to have secondary

(9)),

or the smaller scope

or the larger

in

and ( 10 ) can
( 3 ).
( 9 )
in the fashion of Principia
Hathematica *14,
,

.

by
(9')

~/T?x)(Fx]7g( 7x)(Fx)

and
(10') /C?x)(Fx}7~G(?x)(Fx)

respectively, where "/T?x) (F
xJ 7 " is the scope operator
and ( 10 ') are, by definition, equivalent

.

(

9 .)

to

(9”)

~(Ex)((y)(Fy s y = x)

Gx)

•

and

(10") (Ex)((y)(Fy

= y = x)

.

~Gx)

respectively.
Now in the case of the George IV puzzle,
where "Scott"
is construed as a name, the difference in the
scope of "the
author of Waver ley " makes the difference between a
valid and

an invalid argument.

If its scope

is the larger scope,

then
the position in which "the author of Waverley "
occurs in B
i® substitutive
for, where "£" represents any

function:

;

r

z=

(i*)(&l)

3 (LWz))

is a theorem of L +" 7" (+...).

s

Zr>x)(#xj7f.Wji)(#i)))‘ 1
But we have assumed that every

theorem of L^+"7" (+...) is valid.

In particular,

therefore,

where "the author of Waverley " has the larger scope in B,
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A through C will be formulated
as
A y = (?x)(Fx)
B /[)x)(Fz]y~K (y = (»x)(Fx))
0 ~K (y = y)
z

which is a valid argument in I^. 16
However, this argument is
not the George IV puzzle. For
the puzzle
engendered by the
(normal) interpretation of the
position of "the author of
Waverley"
in B as nonsubstitutive.
Hence, insofar as the argument
from

U

A to C is a puzzle,

the scope of the description
in B is the

smaller scope.
Here, then, we have a method of
obtaining the argument
forms of all puzzles threatening the
validity of n. Having
determined which occurrences of referring
expressions are
nonstandard referential occurrences
(that is, occurrences of
definite descriptions), we then use
Frege's and Quine's
subst ltut lvity criterion to determine,
not nonstandard referential
occurrence, but scope of description.
H
(

Supposing "Coriscus" to be a name, the
logical form of
in
Lg,
’*) >
is therefore

(U)

y

(?x)(Px)

•

(K (Oy)

•

z

~K /r>x)(FxJ7G(;x)(Fx))
z

which is not the negation of an instance of
(i) and does
not imply (C*).
(C*) is therefore a falsidical

paradox.
Where, on the other hand, "(?x)(Fx)" has the
larger scope
in (P*), the implication to (C*) is valid
in
but
1^,

is logically false

in 1^.

Similarly, the logical form of

the George IV puzzle, in L^,
(12)

y =

(

7x) (Fx)

(p*)

is

3 (^ z/Cjx)(Fx)J(y

=

(?x)(Fx))

3 ~K

(y = y))

which is not an instance of (i), and its corresponding
argument
form is invalid in the language
The conclusion C is therefore
a falsidical paradox as well.
Again, if "(7x)(Fx)" has the
.
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larger scope in B, then, as we have
seen, the argument is
valid in L
hut intuitively unobjectionable
R
Leonard Linsky evidently takes issue
with my last
,

statement.

Linsky seems to think a reading of
"the author of Waver ley" has the
larger scope
interpretation"

)

is "wrong".

B,

where

(-the primary

In fact, he gives an argument

for its being wrong:
ls * ron S> for
on ^i S interpretation entails
".
that Layerley was not oo-authored.
If Waverley had been
co-authored it would not, on the primap—
interpretation,
be logroaily possible that George IV
wished to' know whether
Scott was the author of Uaverley . But
no plausible analysis
of our proposition (hereafter 1'B.g)
can have this consequence.
U
Clent 00ndlt10 '1 for the truth of
/\J i s that George IV
shouid have asked, in all seriousness, 'Is
Scott the author
of Waverley?'
Now surely he could have seriously
asked
this question though Waver ley had been
co-authored .7
I

V "\

This argument cannot prove that there is no true
primary
interpretation of B. For, that George IV should have
asked,
in all seriousness, "Is Scott the author of
Waver ley ?" can
only be a sufficient condition for the truth of
B if there is
no true primary interpretation of B; and this Linsky
has not
shown.

* 12 Toward Formalization

The moral of this part of our story is that what
Carnap
called "the antinomy of the name relation" _is an antinomy,
only if every referential occurrence is a standard
referential

occurrence.

That every referential occurrence is a standard
referential occurrence is tantamount to the proposition that

every referential occurrence is an occurrence of a standard
proper name. But as we have just seen, each solution consists
in analyzing some referential occurrences as occurrences of
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(1) ambiguous names

(Prege

)

,

(

2

)

incomplete symbols (Russell),

or (3) orthographic accidents (Quine).

The three theories of nonstandard referential
occurrence,
whose solutions we have just reviewed, were selected
for study
because of the influence each has had on contemporary
attempts
to formalize some of the languages which generate
puzzles of the
kind in question. Although all of these theories have
the

consequence that these puzzles do not have antinomies for
conclusions, some of these theories have the consequence that
we cannot "quantify into" these languages.

According to the

theory that nonstandard referential occurrences are orthographic
accidents, the logical forms of sentences containing these

occurrences contain no individual symbols (variables or
constants)
in any expressions that replace these occurrences.
These

occurrences are buried, on analysis, within predicates and
names (of sentences). But, given the ordinary interpretation
of quantifiers, you cannot quantify into predicates or names.

Doubtless, if a sentence containing a nonstandard referential
occurrence has the logical form just depicted, then it is

impossible to quantify into these languages, given the ordinary

interpretation of quantifiers.
the conclusion that this

is_

But why should we acquiesce in

the logical form of sentences

containing nonstandard referential occurrences?
There are a number of ways of avoiding this conclusion.
One way is Russell's, and still another is Frege's.

Frege's

theory does not give us quite what we want, however, if by

"quantifying in" we mean the following:

we are able to derive

quantified sentences, with "it is necessary that," "believes
that," and like modal expressions, applied to matrices whose

variables are bound by the initial quantifiers, where these
quantifiers are read, "There is something x such that" or
"Each thing x is such that."

Such formalizations are, of course,
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impossible

within Frege's theory.

Nevertheless, It may be
possible to formulate and derive,
using essentially Fregean
methods, sentences which have the
same English readings
as
sentences which are obtained by
quantifying in, as characterised
above. That is, the absence
of a proposal within
Frege's
discussion for formulating and deriving
sentences like
"There is something which is
necessarily greater than five"
and "There is someone whom Ralph
believes to be a spy" does
not foreclose the possibility of
formulating and deriving
such sentences in a way compatible
with Frege’s doctrine,
and we shall encounter one such
proposal in Chapter
,

V.

But if

am not mistaken, we can adhere
to an interpretation
of nonstandard referential occurrences
as opaque occurrences
I

(occurrences within opaque contexts) and
still avoid the
conclusion that we cannot quantify into
opaque contexts,
given the ordinary interpretation of
quantifiers. What I
must prove, then, is that to be an opaque
occurrence is not
to be an orthographic accident.
What I must prove is that
there is still some hope for opaquely
occurring referring
expressions. They need not he locked up forever
inside

indissoluble complex names and general terms.
To that end I present arguments to the contrary.

The

arguments are those of W. V. Quine, author of
the theory that
nonstandard referential occurrences are orthographic
accidents
and the most influential critic of first-order
formalizations
of modal languages.

Modal languages, in the broad sense,

include, prominently, languages of necessity and
possibility
and languages of propositional attitude
These, among
languages exhibiting nonstandard referential occurrence,
.

have received the most thorough logical study, and
it is
to these languages that subsequent discussion is
restricted.
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16 In a simplified natural-deduction
setting
would look like this:

(Fx)((u ) (Fu S u = x)
x = y)
(Ex)((u ) (Pu 5 U = x)
~K (x = y))
z
3 ~K z (y = y)
4 (u ) (Fu = u = w)
w = y
5 Fy = y = w
6 w = y
7 y = w
1

.

2

.

*

the proof

Definition (A)
Definition (B)

Assumption (1)

8 Fy
9 (u ) (Fu = u = v)
10 Fy 5 y = V
ll y = v
12 V = y
13 ~K (v = y)
14
y)

•

~k (v = y)
z

Assumption

(2)

Note that 14 follows from 12 and
13 by (i) and MP in L^+"?
17

Linsky, on. cit

. ,

p.

69 .

1S T+

It would apnear that Linsky* s line of
reasoning should
lead him to conclude that any number of de_ re
interpretations
of propositional-attitude constructions are
wrong, and it would
appear that the imagined wrongness of these
interpretations
is not due to any peculiarities of definite
descriptions.
Suppose "the Eternal City" is a name. Suppose
further that
someone, call him "Tom", is unaware that "the Eternal
City"
names Rome, about whose existence Tom has no doubts,
and
that

Tom wishes to know whether the Eternal City exists
Following a distinction of Quine's, in "Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes," we suppose that "wishes to know"
has its relational," as against its "notional," sense in (l^.
Call this interpretation of (l) "the relational interpretation."
So interpreted, (l) implies, in L,
(1)

(2)

(Ex) (Tom wishes to know whether (Ey)(y = x))

Compare Linsky' s argument with the following argument that
there is no true relational interpretation of (l); that is,
that the relational interpretation of ( 1
is wrong:
)
It is wrong, for (l) on this interpretation entails that
the Eternal City exists.
If the Eternal City did not
exist it would not, on the relational interpretation,
be logically possible that Tom wishes to know whether
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t

6

6

™

City exists *

1

But no plausible

analysis
/I! can have
this consequence. A sufficient
condition for the truth of (l) is that Torn
should
have asked,
all seriousness, 'Does the Eternal
City exist?'
Wow surely he could have asked
this
question though the Eternal City had not
existed
ot^

,

m

Again, the argument simply assumes what it
purports to prove.
One detects in Linsky's argument the ingredients
of an argument
s ® COndary ( cf * notional) interpretations
of propositionalattitude constructions do not (in the absence of
supporting
premises) imjply primary (cf. relational)
interpretations of
these constructions. This is, however, not
what Linsky says.
.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEMS FOR FORMALIZATION:
A STUDY OF QUINE'S ARGUMENTS

$1 Introduction
In all of Quine's discussions of the problems
of

interpreting languages of necessity and possibility
and
languages of propositional attitude, to which
quantifiers
have been added, the point of departure is the
problem

of

making sense of quantified sentences with "it is
necessary
that," "believes that," and the like, applied to
matrices
whose variables are bound by the initial
quantifiers. But
the more interesting problem, still, is one of
making sense
of such quantified sentences, when the quantifiers
"(Ex)"
and "(x)" are read "There is something x such that" and

"Each thing x is such that."
Quine once proposed a way of making sense of sentences
like
(1)

(Ex)N(x is identical with the morning star),

where "N" corresponds to the words, "it is necessary that;"
but it would be premature to suppose that (l) can be read as
(2)

There is something which is necessarily identical with
the morning star.

The proposal, contained in "The Problem of Interpreting Modal
Logic," was presented in the form of the following "criterion":
(ii) An existential quantification holds if there is a
constant whose substitution for the variable of quantification
would render the matrix true.-*-

Presumably, the result of replacing the variable by a constant

renders the matrix true, if and only if the result is analytic:
64
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(i) The result of prefixing
to any statement is
true if and only if the statement is analytic.

Quine proceeded to argue that (ii) has "queer
ontological
consequences." By this Quine meant that if the contemplated

version of quantified modal^ logic (hereafter "QML"
can be
)
interpreted in a consistent way, then its variables do not
range over material objects.

Consequently,

(l)

cannot be

read as (2), since "x" does not have for its value the
material object, or thing, the morning star.
But (ii) cannot have, all by itself, queer ontological
consequences. The conjunction of (ii) with other premises,

which specify properties of the contemplated language, may,
however, have such consequences.
It is evident, from the
discussion, what relevant properties the language possesses.
Its basis consists of all quantification laws (including all
tru th— funct ional laws); formation rules are those of quantification

theory augmented only by the addition to its basis of the modal
operators, "M" and "N" (read, respectively, "it is possible
that" and "it is necessary that"); and a "constant" is

interpreted as any referring expression which has a unique
reference.

Constants are the formal counterparts of names,

as defined in Chapter III,

(Chapter III,

§

3»

and we have already observed

10) that Quine construes referring expressions

which have unique references as names.
As we shall see, in this and the following chapter, there
are a number of ways of avoiding queer ontological consequences
in a system of QML.

That is, there are a number of ways of

doing QML which do not involve the repudiation of material objects
from one's universe of discourse.

There are, to put the point

in still another and more fruitful way,

systems of QML which

give truth conditions for existential quantifications in these

languages, where the quantifier "(Ex)" is read "There is something
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X such that,- and the variable of
quantification occurs
inside the scope of any modal
operator.

And it may be
added that there are systems of
epistemic and doxastic
logic which give truth conditions
for existential quantifications
in these languages, where the
quantifier "(Ex)" reads
"There is something x such that,"
and the variable of
quantification occurs inside the scope of
any epistemic
or doxastic operator.
If these truth conditions are

semantically sustainable,
then some of Quine's objections to
quantifying into languages
of necessity and possibility and
languages of propositional
attitude have been met. To have met these
objections does
not imply that Quine has no basis for
denying the legitimacy
of these formal enterprises. The
objections that concern
us are those which hold that deductions
by some form of
existential generalisation are intuitively
invalid. There
can be no doubt that the deductions which
Quine contemplates
are intuitively invalid. There is no need,
however, to acquiesce
in the conclusion that the deductions
contemplated by Quine
are forced upon the logician bent upon quantifying
into
languages of necessity and possibility and languages
of

propositional attitude.

On the other hand,

it seems certain
that any version of QML is committed to some version of

Aristotelian essentialism

:

the doctrine that some attributes

are essential to some objects; and even with regard to
those objects about which Quine feels perhaps the least

reluctance to admit essential attributes

— numbers — the

expressed view has been that "to be necessarily greater
than 7 is not a trait of a number;"^ that necessity, if
it is to be understood at all, attaches to statements.

This is surely

a

view which, in A. F. Smullyan's phrase,

"impedes the progress of modal logic. "5

But if one is
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willing (for whatever reason) to countenance
the contrary view—
that numbers, and perhaps other things
as well, have
essential

attributes— then one may construe the sentence,
"nine

is necessarily
greater than five," as expressing an attribute
of nine; in which
case the inference to "There is something
which is necessarily
greater than five" seems intuitively valid.
In succeeding pages we shall encounter
various versions
of QML, alternative to Quine’s contemplated
version, which

give truth conditions for sentences like
These alternative
(2).
versions of QML range from the most conservative,
which involves
no interference with any of the logical laws
assumed in Quine's
discussion, but offers a different account of
"constant" (and
in some cases, though it is not necessary, an
addition to the

notation of the operator "Ox)"); to the most radical,
which
involves restricting one of the most fundamental of
quantification
laws. An intermediate, but still essentially left-wing,
version
of QML involves restricting a less fundamental
quantification
law.
Of these alternative versions of QML, I shall argue

(in Chapter V), the most radical fails to give semantically

sustainable truth conditions for its quantified sentences.
In some respects, this version of QML— "contingent identity"
systems, by name
the Sophists'

— is

puzzle:

reminiscent of Aristotle's way out of
not merely because,

I

venture to say,

both fail; but, more specifically, because both betray a
less than firm grasp of the concept of identity.
But let us now consider Quine's challenge

what it is

— to

— for

that is

the possibility of giving semantically sustainable

truth conditions for existential quantifications of the kind

described above.
presented.

Two versions of this challenge will be

In one, Quine proves that interpreting the syntax

of a given system of QML yields a contradiction.

In another,

Quine proves that "(Ex)NFx" is meaningless in a given system
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of QML (the same system as before).

Both arguments are easily

modified to prove the semantical inconsistency and
meaninglessness,
respectively, of given systems of quantified epistemic
logic and

quantified doxastic logic.

§ 2

Quine's Challenge

Version

:

1

We do a proof in the hypothesized system of
"The Problem
of Interpreting Modal Logic," assuming that variables
range
over material objects:
1

Morning star = evening star

2

(El)(i - evening star

3

Evening star

—

(Ex)(Ey)(x = y

6

(x) (y ) (x = y

D

•

N(morning star = morning star)

N(x = morning star))

evening star

4 (Ex ) (x = evening star
5

•

•

•

~N(evening star = morning star)

~N(x = morning star))

(N(x - morning star)

•

(N(x = morning star)

D

~Il(y =

•

morning star))

N(y = morning star))

The contradiction is avoided if we take as the values of the

variables of the system something other than material objects.
Individual concepts are suggested by Quine.
1

is false,

In this event,

since the individual concept, the morning star,

is not identical with the individual concept,

the evening star.

The relation between the aforementioned concepts is called

"congruence" (in symbols, "C").

We no longer derive 5, but

only
5'

(Ex) (Ey) (x C y

•

(N(x C morning star)

.

~N(y

C

morning star))

which is not at all paradoxical, since the individual concepts,
the morning star and the evening star (and, for that matter,

Venus) are diverse entities.
In this version of Quine's challenge,
of existential generalization:

the following rule
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(BG

0)
variable,

Prom a, infer r (E x)0^, where x is any
individual
a_ is any individual constant,
and OC and
are
(3

any wf f s

and

and

differ only in that in one or more
places where OC contains
contains free x
,

OC

[3

is assumed to hold (see criterion (ii)) for the
purpose of
giving truth conditions for sentences like (l) (see
above,

page 64 ).

This assumption is not necessarily one for
reductio ad absurdum, for we may be able to disavow some
other assumption (as, for example, that a constant is any
referring expression which has a unique reference). But

Quine has definite reasons for adhering to the other assumptions
which he makes about his contemplated version of QML. In

particular, concerning his reasons for assuming that a
constant is any referring expression which has a unique
reference, the following may be said:
In "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic," as

throughout Quine's discussions, the theme is that necessity
is to be explained by analyticity; hence criterion (i) and
the not-independent criterion (ii).

is the following:

The thesis, in brief,

the truth value of every sentence

containing "N" is to be explained, either directly or
indirectly, in terms of a sentence prefixed by "N" where
,

"the result of prefixing fj IS'J to any statement is true
if and only if the

statement is analytic" (criterion (i)).

Now in a language which contains no individual symbols
save variables, sentences of the forms r (Ex)Mo

where

OC

l

and '"(Ex^Ntt

contains free x, are intelligible, on Quine's

lights, only if these sentences are transformable into
sentences of the forms ^(ExJqT and r N(Ex)cf; "but,"
1

says Quine, "unfortunately matrices are not generally

thus transformable."

In view of the failure of the

aforementioned conversions, names seem the natural choice

1

,
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for specifying the values of variables
in modal contexts.
Moreover, in the absence of a theory to
distinguish standard
proper names from other names (cf. Kaplan’s
treatment (Chapter
v > §9)), a name is any referring
expression which has a unique
reference
In his review of "The Problem of
Interpreting Modal Logic,"
A. F. Smullyan states that if a constant
is a "singular

descriptive phrase," then
we would find that the principle of existential
generalization
would be invalid ... This may be shown by example.
It is
certain that -(The author of Waver ley was a
non-author'),
for the scope of the description here is ’The
author of
Waver ley was a non-author.’ But it would just as
certainly
be an egregious error to infer from this truth
the following:
(3x) (L_ ~( x was a non-author)).
For this last statement
implies that it is logically necessary that there
are
authors, a proposition that is more comforting than
true.^
I

But this is just more grist for Quine’s mill.

Quine is quite

convinced that existential generalization is invalid in his
system of QML, as long as material objects are the values of
its variables, and requires for that assurance no appeal to
the theorem I_ (E_x)'N'a
N^ExJgT . At the conclusion of "The
1

Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic," Quine says that the
modal logician may "disavow the criterion (ii) which underlies

my argument.

But then we have yet to see what might plausibly

be put forward in its stead.

£ 3

Quine

*

s

Challenge

:

Version

_2

Quine’s challenge to the semantical sustainability of
QML more often takes the form of an argument for the conclusion
that sentences of the forms r (Ex)M0? and r (Ex)NC?, where
free

x.>

OC

contains

are meaningless; although what Quine proves is that

these sentences are meaningless in his contemplated version of QML.
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But the system is now described in the terms
of his earlier
paper, "Notes on Existence and Necessity."^
The language is
"referent lally opaque," and names in the language
do not occur
"purely referent ially" in the language.
The alleged meaninglessness of sentences of
the form 3
(Ex)MQt and
(Ex)NoT where Oc contains free x, is now
1

,

characterized as the meaninglessness of quantifications
(generalizations) into opaque contexts. And sometimes
Quine is led to the dogmatic conclusion, "You cannot
quantify
into an opaque construction," 10 disregarding, it
seems,
the

possibility indicated at the conclusion of "The Problem
of
Interpreting Modal Logic" (see $ 2)
In order to evaluate the present criticism, we should
become as clear as possible about the terms in which it is

formulated.

The following definitions are closest in
formulation to the account given in V ord and Object page
,

(Def. 3)

A context

<£( )

is referent ially transparent

144:

,

if and only if, for any name a and any name

or sentence
in ^(ci)

,

'iT'(ja),

then

a.

if a is purely referential

is also purely referential in

the containing name or sentence ^(^(a))

(Def. 4 )

A context £() is referent ially opaque

,

if and

only if there is a name a and a name or sentence

Ka)

such that a is purely referential

in'lf'(a),

and a is not purely referential in the containing
name or sentence

As Definitions
(Cons.)

3

and

4

A context

a))

imply,
^>(

)

is either referentially transparent

or referentially opaque and not both

Quine's account of "purely referential occurrence" is given

72

as follows:
I call an occurrence of a singular term
/name? in
a statement purely referential (Frege
geradeT, if.
roughly speaking, the term serves in that particular
context simply to refer to its object.
:

The interdef inable terras, "referential transparency"
and "purely referential occurrence," are often defined,

by philosophers, in terms of the validity of the rule
(SIq), below, as follows:
(Def. 5)

A sentence

OC

context Jot

:

is a ref erent ially transparent
a name

a occurs purely

referentially in a sentence

OcJ ,

if and only

if the following is a valid inference

From r a = b n and Qc, infer j3, where a and
0)
are any names and OC and {3 are any sentences, and Oc

(SI
b^

and
Oc

(3

differ only in that in one or more places where

contains

a_,

j3

contains

b_

(Definitions

3

a language.

Which referring expressions are to count as

through

5 do not

require relativization to

names in a language is of course a variable.

But determination

of namehood is presupposed in the definitions.)

Quine does not appear to hold any stronger claim than
that the validity of (SI

Q)

is a necessary condition of

referential transparency (purely referential occurrence).
However, where this and all other indicated conditions of

referential transparency are satisfied by a language (for example,
names serve in their contexts simply to refer to their objects),
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there is some justification in calling
these languages
referentially transparent (the occurrences
of the names
in the language purely referential).

To prove that the language of
Quine's contemplated
version of QML is referentially opaque,

it suffices to
prove that the context »N()» is
referentially opaque. To
prove that "N()" is referentially
opaque, it suffices to
prove that (SI ) is invalid in the
language. The following
Q

illustrates the invalidity:

N(morning star = morning star)
2 Evening star = morning star
1

3

^(evening star = morning star)

Quine will argue that the referential
opacity of the
language is exhibited also in the following
proof:
1'

N(nine is greater than five)

2'

(Ex)N(x is greater than five)

But what does not wear itself on its forehead
is the nontruth
of "(Ex)N(x is greater than five)."
It may he held that 2'
is not true because it asserts that something
has the trait
of being necessarily greater than five, and being

necessarily

gr eater than
i£ true, then

ive
jL

is not

£

trait of

£

number

And since

.

1'

1*

does not assert that nine has the trait of
being necessarily greater than five.

This line of argument may serve to prove invalidity,
but it does not serve to prove referential opacity
For we
.

cannot simply conclude that if the blanks in r
£ ...“>
do not express a trait of the bearer of a, then a occurs
opaquely (that is, not purely referentially) therein. For
.

.

substitut ivity (SI^) is still a reliable criterion of opacity;
yet -(£ exemplifies £)"* is not referentially opaque
by this
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criterion, in spite of the fact that r ~(a
exemplifies a)"
does not express a trait of the hearer of
12
a.
Moreovlr,
the present line of argument rests its
case for the nontruth
of 2* on the premise that essentialism
is a nontrue doctrine;
and this line of argument will not serve
at all to prove
that (EG ) is even invalid—much less a
criterion of
1

opacity-

0
in languages of propositional attitude.

What is needed is an argument for the nontruth
of
which at the same time proves 1' referentially
opaque.

2'

There
is such an argument, and that argument happily
can be used to

prove opacity in languages of propositional
attitude as well.
More happily, still, that argument also serves
to prove the
meaninglessness of quantifications into opaque contexts,
which is what Quine is ultimately concerned to prove.

The argument in question rests its case for the
nontruth
of 2' on the meaning of a meaningful open sentence
Specifically,
.

Every meaningful open sentence

(0)

referentially

<£x is

transparent
where
(Def. 6)

An open sentence £>x is referentially transparent,
if and only if, for all names a^ and b, if r a = b -1
and

5^a_

are true,

For the sake of completeness,
(Def. 7)

I

<£>b

is true

include the following trivialities:

If P (E2.) £x~ is a meaningful existential quantification,
<

then
(Def. 8)

then

If

OC

^x

i

is a meaningful open sentence

is true, then

oc

is meaningful

Now it is a simple matter to prove that

2'

given the above principle and definitions; since

by the above principle and definitions.

is not true,
2'

is meaningless,

Furthermore, we are able
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to prove that 1*

1

is ref erentially opaque, given (Cons.).

"(Ex)N(x is greater than five)" is a true
existential quantification

Assumption
for reductio

(Ex)N(x is greater than five)" is a
meaningful existential quantification
3 "N(x is greater than five)" is a meaningful
open sentence
2 "

(Def. 8)
(Def.

4 "N(x is greater than five)" is referentially

(

transparent

number of planets = nine" is true
6 "N(nine is greater than five)" is true

5 "The

7

Premise

"N(the number of planets is greater than
five)" is true

(Def. 6)

Premise

"N(x is greater than five)" is not
referentially transparent

(Def. 6) and
truth-functions

10 "N(x is greater than five)" is not a
meaningful open sentence
11 "(Ex)N(x is greater than five)"

0)

Premise

8 It is false that 7
9

7)

(0) and
truth-functions

is not a

(Def. 7) and

meaningful existential quantification

truth-functions

12 "(Ex)N'(x is greater than five)" is not true

(Def. 8) and

truth-functions

The preceding argument proves the invalidity of the inference

from

1'

language

to 2’
;

(6,

12) and hence the invalidity of (EG

the referential opacity of 1«

as we see (5,

6,

Q)

in the

(but really by (SI

Q ),

8)); and the meaninglessness of this instance

7,

of quantification into an opaque context (11).

But it is obvious

that we can generalize to prove the meaninglessness of every

instance of quantification into an opaque context:
1

2 It

is any opaque context
is not true that, for all names
if r a_ = b” and $ a_ are true, then

Assumption
a.

1

<£>b

and b,
is

true
3 <Px

(Cons . )
(Def. 5)j and

truth-functions

is not a meaningful open sentence

(0),

(Def.

6), and

truth-functions
4 r (Ex)£x

'

is not a meaningful existential

quantification

(Def.

7) and

truth-functions
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V

4 Conclusions

Has Quine proved his case? It all
depends on what you
take his case to be. Suppose you
take it to be the conclusion
that
(C.l)

You cannot give semantically
sustainable truth conditions

for existential quantifications in
languages of necessity
and possibility and languages of
propositional attitude,
where the quantifier "(Ex)" reads "There
is something
x such that," and the variable of
quantification occurs
inside the scope of any modal, epistemic,
or doxastic
operator

Then if Quine has proved his conclusion, that
conclusion is
sustained by the argument of 2 or the argument
of §3 or both.
{
Both of these arguments depend for their soundness
on
the proposition that all languages of necessity
and possibility
and all languages of propositional attitude are

referentially

opaque.
(0).

Both arguments also presuppose the truth of
principle
But it is possible to subscribe to
(0) while denying

the first-mentioned proposition, as we shall now
see.

The intuitive justification given for
(0) has been that
0£g.n
sentence
expresses a genuine condition on an object
11 HL
* hen that °P en sentence is true or false of
that object no
,

13

matter 1° 2L
object i_s specified
The question whether
this italicized sentence expresses a proposition sufficient
to justify (0) we may, for the present, put aside.
It does

Hi

.

not, by itself, express a proposition sufficient to justify
a less subtle assumption in Quine's argument.

For the

soundness of his argument requires that "specification"
consists in replacing the free variable in an open sentence

by a name

.

But clearly one need not specify an object in

,
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this way.

Definite descriptions specify objects.
Suppose
the author of Wa verley satisfies some
open sentence symbolized
M
*y " Fx " in
Then in
( Bx )((y)(Ay * y «
X) . Px)« is
a way of specifying an object that
satisfies the open sentence
"Fx".
If all names refer in the standard
way in some modal
language— that is, if all names in the language
are standard
proper names— and every object is specified,
in the language,
by definite description or standard proper

V

’

V

name, then one does
not get, in this language, the intuitively
invalid derivations
that one does get in Quine's hypothesized
modal language.
But it is on the basis of these invalid
derivations in a

language that the language is defined ((Def.
5)) as referentially
opaque; and it is on the basis of these derivations
that Quine

has sometimes purported to prove the inconsistency
(§?) and
meaninglessness (§3) of quantified modal logic.
Furthermore, if every name in some modal language is
a standard proper name, then, since the language
is not
referentially opaque, Quine's criterion (ii) (}l) is
adequate
as a truth condition for existential quantif ications
in at
least one language of necessity and possibility.

That is,

(iii) An existential quantification holds in L

if
rl

there is a constant whose substitution for the variable
of quantification would render the matrix true.

But we can conjoin to (iii) the following truth condition:
(iv) An existential quantification holds in

if

there is a definite description whose substitution for
the variable of quantification would render the matrix

true,

if the description had the largest possible scope

in the matrix.

Substitution instances of the sort described in (iv) are true,
according to many modal logicians, when the matrix (open sentence)
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is of the form r Wfe-\ and the
predioate of the matrix
and, furthermore, some predicates
are necessary.

u

neoessary

This lately
expressed view seems to be repugnant
to Quine. Or perhaps it
is just the view that some
nonlogical predicates are necessary
to some objects which is repugnant
to Quine. His objections
have not, I think, been made very
clear. At any rate, Quine
has no conclusive argument that the
notion of necessary and
contingent attribution is incoherent.

Quine has sometimes produced an
alternative challenge to
the meaningfulness of sentences of
the form p (Ex)M 4P and p
(Ex)Efc\
where Oc contains free x, assuming a system
of QML in which

material objects are specified by descriptive
phrases rather
than names. The system contains the axiom
"N(p

g>

q)

D

(

Np DNq)."

But now let us ban singular terms other
than variables.
We can still specify things; instead
of specifying them
by designation we specify them by conditions
that uniquely
determine them. On this approach we can still
challenge
the coherence of ( 4 /(3x) necessarily
x is odd7, by asking
)
that such an object be specified.
One answer is that
(5)

(3£)(£ = i =

Z£=£

+

£

+ £).
j

But that same number x is uniquely determined
also by
this different condition:
there are x planets. Yet ( 5
)
entails 'x is odd* and thus evidently sustains
’necessarily
x is odd’, while 'there are x planets' does not. 1 4

Now it must be admitted that this argument moves in
mysterious
ways.
In particular, the move from the statement about

entailments and nonentailments to the conclusion, that
"(3x) necessarily x is odd" is of doubtful coherence, is
mysterious.

The coherence of an open sentence has been

defined by referential transparency; but if we are working
within a system in which the only individual symbols are

variables, then
conclusion.

(

0 ) cannot be appealed to to sustain that

Moreover, extending the notion of referential

transparency to apply to variables is of no avail; for it is
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certain that whatever principle of meaningfulness
of open
sentences is assumed by Quine, that principle is not
Quine's
standard one involving the notion of identity
The question,
.

"What is this thing which is necessarily odd?
The thing
which is necessarily identical with the sum of its
three
square roots?

That is, the thing which contingently numbers
the planets?" is easily answered in the affirmative.
It is

easily answered in the affirmative, that is, unless one
objects
to essentialism.
Some
have taken Quine's alternative challenge
to be a challenge of the coherence of necessary and contingent
attribution, and perhaps that is all it is.
(i say "all", for

have already inlicated that Quine has no conclusive argument
that the notion of necessary and contingent attribution is
I

incoherent.)

In any event, the basis for the conclusion that

"(3x) necessarily x is odd" is of doubtful coherence, on the
present line of reasoning, is not transparent.
I

have been arguing that neither version of Quine's

challenge sustains (C.l).

This is so because you can have

a modal language which is not ref erentially opaque, as we

have seen, by simply adopting Russell's theory of descriptions

with its method of contextual definition.
Formally speaking, the disavowable implicit assumption
of both of Quine's arguments is that a constant is any referring

expression which has a unique reference.

Quine frequently

makes a similar assumption about languages of propositional
attitude, and this assumption is equally disavowable; for a

Russellian approach to languages of propositional attitude is

equally feasible, and criteria (iii) and (iv) hold for such
languages
But just as a Russellian treatment offers us one method
of specifying objects which enables us to give semantically

sustainable truth conditions for quantifications in languages

8o

of necessity and possibility,

so there may be others.

Suppose
there are others and moreover that among these at least
one
interprets some open sentence <£x as ref erentially
opaque. Then
is
false.
For an open sentence $x must express a genuine
(0)

condition on (be true or false of) an object, if there
are
r
semantically sustainable truth conditions for (Ex)<£x _l
.

What matters,

I

have been trying to say, for a reconciliation

of the mixture of quantifiers and modalities with the
intuitive
grounds of Quine's objections to the mixture, is that we
are
able to give semantically sustainable truth conditions
for

quantifications in modal languages, however we go about it.
I have argued that if you take Quine's case to be (C.l),
then Quine has not proved his case.

But suppose you take it

to be, not (C.l), but the conclusion that

(C.2)

You cannot give semantically sustainable truth conditions
for existential quantifications in ref erentially opaoue

languages.
In short, "you cannot quantify into opaque contexts."

Then

whether Quine has proved his case or not still depends on
what is meant by "quantifying into opaque contexts." When
Quine says that you cannot quantify into opaque contexts,
he means that you cannot validly existentially generalize,

in

accordance with the rule (EGq), if (l) a occurs opaquely in
r (Ex)pn is interpreted
Of, and (2)
in its customary way, by

which he means,

ft

satisfies (0).

Given these supporting lemmas,

the inadmissibility of quantifying into opaque contexts is

undeniable.

Those who argue that quantification into opaque

contexts is possible clearly mean something different by the
phrase "quantifying into opaque contexts."

conception of the phrase seems in order.

But a more general
Imagine a system

that is in every respect like those hypothesized by Quine,
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save for containing (EGq) as a rule.

In its stead there is
some other rule which provides for existentially
generalizing
on opaquely occurring names.
Clearly, we want to say of this

imagined system that opaque contexts are quantified
into.
Nor
should Quine object peremptorily. Recall his closing
words
in "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic."
In the following chapter I examine some approaches
to
quantifying into opaque contexts. Some of these, I shall

try to show, are reconcilable with the intuitive grounds of
Quine's objections to quantifying into opaque contexts.
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CHAPTER FIVE

EXPLICATIONS OF REFERENT IALLY OPAQUE OPEN
SENTENCES

§ 1

Introduction

We saw in the previous chapter that it is possible
to

provide semantically sustainable truth conditions for
sentences
of the form r (Ex)N^~\ where r (Ex) n is read rThere
is something
-1
x such that . We have yet to see that it is possible to
provide
semantically sustainable truth conditions for sentences of
the
_1
r
r
form (Ex)Nlfcc , where N#x_~ is referentially opaque (by (Def.
6)
and (Cons.)).
1

In this chapter I shall endeavor to prove the possibility

in question.

I shall

try to show that you can quantify into

opaquely construed contexts of necessity and possibility, as
well as opaquely construed contexts of propositional attitude.

Pursuant to this end

I

shall work within imagined systems of

modal, epistemic, and doxastic logic.

A semantics will be

constructed for fragments of each of these systems, within

which a number of inferences will be proved valid or invalid.
It is believed that our results intuitively validate existential
generalization rules for referentially opaque languages to
replace (EG

thereby answering Quine's challenge at the
q ),
conclusion of "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic."

Having shown what generalization rules may plausibly be put
forward in place of (EG^), we may then show what criteria
of the meaningfulne ss of open sentences may plausibly be

put forward in place of (0).
I

next call attention to some striking analogies between

the approach to quantifying in, taken in this thesis, and a

certain theory of quantifying in, along Fregean lines.
Finally, I attempt to show that contingent identity systems

systems in which the theorem schema (12) is invalidated
83

— are

not
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semantically sustainable; that within such systems you cannot

meaningfully quantify into opaque contexts.

§

2

A Semantics for a Modal Logic (L^

In the following pages I shall work within imagined systems
of modal, epistemic, and doxastic logic.

The contemplated

systems bear conspicuous similarities to existing systems of

Jaakko Hintikka,

especially with respect to the intended

interpretation of quantifiers, but they are also dissimilar
to Hintikka'

s

systems in some conspicuous respects.

One

conspicuous dissimilarity between the two sets of systems
is that formulas of Hintikka' s systems are arbitrary formulas,

whereas formulas of the imagined systems are not arbitrary
formulas.

This syntactical dissimilarity results in a

conspicuous dissimilarity in semantical approaches.

Hintikka'

semantical approach to modal and epistemic logic utilizes
the notion of a model system

a set of model sets

:

(sets of

formulas), related by what he calls the relation of

"alternativeness," which satisfy certain conditions of

consistency (or a property akin to consistency).
By contrast, the approach taken here is the more

familiar model-theoretic approach, utilizing the notion of
a model .

Semantics will be constructed for fragments of

the contemplated modal, epistemic, and doxastic systems,
in which semantics models are defined for the three systems.

The important features of these semantics are due to
o

Robert

C.

Sleigh, Jr.

epistemic system only.

Sleigh develops a semantics for an
However, we can obtain interpreted

modal and doxastic systems by making certain changes in

Sleigh's presentation, which

I

follow rather closely.
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Th.©

modal case will be considered first.

be called "L^"

.

contains sentence letters:

individual variables:
constants:
"H",

The system will
"p", "q"

"x", "y", "z",

"a”, "b", "c",

with"); the modal operators:

individual

predicate letters:

the dyadic predicate letter:

"="

"M" and "N"

"r”

f

"F",

"G"

,

(read "is identical

(read, respectively,

"it is possible that" and "it is necessary that"); and any
adequate set of symbols in addition to the above.

Let "W" designate a nonempty set of worlds

(w^

Let "L" designate a nonempty set of individuals (u

1

. . .

, . . .

,w.

, . .

.

,u

. .

i?

.

}

}.

Let "R" stand for a dyadic reflexive relation defined over the

members of W.

Let "Q" stand for a function which assigns to

each world a subset of L, such that Q(w^) = Ih

.

Let "V"

represent a binary function whose domain is sets of pairs,
where the first elements are formulas and the second elements
are worlds, and whose range is (l,0)

(V is a valuation function ).

Let "I" represent a binary function whose domain is sets of
pairs, where the first elements are variables, constants and

predicate letters and the second elements are worlds, and whose
range is either D (where the expressions are either variables
or constants) or sets of n-tuples of elements of D (where the

expressions are predicate letters) (i is an interpretation
function ) .

Let "V^" represent V determined by I.

Interpretation functions satisfy the following conditions:
(IF.1) For each variable

x.

and each world w^, l(x,w^) = u,

for some u in D; and for every w. and w., l(x,w.) = l(x,w.)
^

(IF. 2) For each constant

a_

and each world w^,

V

^

0

l(a.»w^) = u,

for some u in D; and it is possible that l(a_,w.) 4 I (a,w
(IF. 3) For each n-ary predicate letter F and each world w^,

l(F,w^) = a set of n-tuples of elements of D (u^,...,u

n>

.)
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Each interpretation
function determines a unique valuation
1.
function satisfying the following conditions:
Atom i c formulas

For any n-ary predicate lette r F and
any terms (variables or constants^ t,....,t
Vv vr
(FCt
+ \ TT
-1’
:

•••»!_;, w.

,

’-n’

- 1 iff

< l(t_^,

jy i=j For any wff

2.

^jV7

3.

v («>w
I

i

4.

l(_t^ ,w^

= 1

)

)

= 1 iff

I

V^Nc^v.)

Of,

I

3

Case 1:

iff either

1

1

iff there is a w
3

3

an y wff

Z

= 0

3

X

B B Por

1

)

= 1 iff, for every w.

^ M7 F°r
i

v^a,*

w.) =

any wff a, V ( rM0T,w. ) =
T
x
1
such that w.Rw. and V_(0?,w.) = 1
5-

)

i

For any wff
3

i

0 l(F,w^)

V^-o^w.

Of,

such that w.Rw., V t (Q!,w.) =
i

)

For any wffs * and 0,
or V (|S,w ) = 1
I

BjE?

)

l

& and any individual variable

x,

If no occurrence of x is within the scope of a modal

operator that in turn is within the scope of the quantifier
binding x, then
V ( r (x)oT,w ) = 1 iff, for any I’, if
I

i

(a) I*

and

(b)

I'

is like I except

(x,w
i

then

)

(possibly) at x

0 Di

= 1

Case 2: If there is an occurrence of x within the scope of a

modal operator that in turn is within the scope of the quantifier
binding x, then
w ^) =
(a)

I*

1

iff, for any I', if

is like I except

and

(b) I'(x,w^) e IK

and

(c) for any w
.

then Vj(&,w^) =

,

3

.

1

(possibly) at x

if w.Rw.,
1

J

then I'(x,w.) e D
3

3
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V

For any terms (variables or constants)
r

=

-j

V’

w

= 1 iff I(i
i>

and

t_.

t

J

y" ±

=

)

1(4,*.)

We note that any ordered quintuple
<W,D,R,Q,I> meeting
the above conditions is a model for
our simplified modal logic;
that
= 0 in case
4 1; and that & is valid
just
in case, for each I,
= 1, for each world w
in each

V^w.)

V^w.)
V^w.)

1

model.

Our semantics validates the theorem
schemata of L^:
( I:L )

^

=

where a is any individual constant

(2l)(2L)(2L = Z. -

individual variables and

(^

Os

)~

l

fi)

and

j

where x and

are any

are any wffs, and

differ only in that in one or more places where
(3 has free ^

a.

and

(3

has free x,

Ct

but does not validate the schema:
ra =
b

(1)

constants and

D

a and

(06
ft

D

-1

/3 )

,

where a and b are any individual

are any wffs, and

that in one or more places where

ex.

Or

and

contains

The invalidity of (l) can be quickly proved.
that the standard Rule of Necessitation:
(N)

If

a

is a theorem,

is validity-preserving in

4.

a.,

[3

differ only in
contains b

We note first

then r N0? is a theorem

By (il) and (N), VjO'Nfa = a)»,w

= 1 , for each I and each world w
i

following conjunction is possible:
Vj(

(3

in each model.

V^'a

= b",w

However, the
)

=

1

and

= b",w^) = 0 .

This is so since, by (IP. 2), we have no
assurance that l(a,w^) = l(a,w ), for any constant a_ and any
’a

two worlds w^ and w^.

Consequently, the following conjunction

)
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is possible,

V^-a

=

b-.v^

= 1 and V^'-Nfa = b)»,v.)
= 0.

Consequently,
(

2)

a = b

D

(N(a = a)

D

N(a = b))

is not valid in L^.

But (2) is an instance of (l).
This result proves
1^ referentially opaque; for if (l) is
not valid, neither is (SI ) . Thus, by (Def.
6) and (Cons.),
Q
there are open sentences of the form
that are referentially
opaque in 1^. The crucial question that remains,
and which

our semantics will help us to answer, is
whether sentences of
the form rN^x“ can be made sense of in spite
of their opacity.
1

Before proceeding to a study of inferences in
L^, I should
remark that as the reader has already observed
certain
qualifications on some previously defined terms are
implicit

—

—

in the present semantical theory, which assigns
truth values
to sentences in a given world or worlds .
Of note, a name

(constant) is to be understood as an expression which
has
a unique reference in a world
Furthermore, an expression
.

is a name if it has, as its unique reference in a
world w
i

*

any individual in D, not necessarily some individual in D^.
For example, "the number of planets" has nine as its
unique reference in the actual world, but it may have another
number as its unique reference in some other logically possible
world. The theory is therefore Fregean in the respect that it

countenances the possibility, at least, of shifts of reference.
It is non-Fregean in the respect that every free variable

within an opaque context bound by a quantifier from without
has for its value a member of the domain of individuals of the
world in which the quantification is true.

Intuitively speaking,

this is the domain of existent individuals; individuals that

exist in the actual world.
On the other hand, we cannot assume that the domain of

individuals of any possible world, and notably the acutal
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world, is not a proper subset of the domain D.
As we shall
see, we cannot account for the invalidity of
certain inferences
without admitting the possibility, at least, of
individuals
existing in some world other than the actual world.
L
is

therefore existence presuppositionless

,

in the sense that its

constants may fail to denote any existent individual.
But if
an expression is a constant, then it has a unique
reference
in some world or other.

Thus, "the author of Principia

Mathe matica " is a constant if, in some logically possible
world, there is an individual who authors and does not co-

author Principia Mathematica .
Therefore, although r a_ =
is possible that

1

a.""

is true in every world,

it

has no unique reference in every world.

r
Consequently, r a = a 1 does not imply, in
(Ex)(x = a) n
1^,
(This can be proved as follows: Assume that V r a = a n ,w.)
(
= 1 and I^ajW^) ^ D^, for some world w^.
Now V ( r (Ex)(x = a)"1
.

I

w^) =
r

only if there is some

1

=

,w

I'

such that I'(x,w.) 6

= 1 only if I' (x,w

^Ti( ^.
)
£
two consequences jointly imply that
.

)

= I'(a,w.
I'

(a,w
i

)

£

J).

;

and

But these

).
,

contrary

to our assumption.)

§ 3

Inferences in L

The principle (0) was intuitively justified, it will be

recalled, by the sentence

:

"If an open sentence expresses a

genuine condition on an object, then that open sentence is
true or false of that object, no matter how the object is

specified."

We have already seen that this sentence, under

any plausible interpretation, is compatible with the sentence:
-1
"An open sentence of the form r N'/'x expresses a genuine

condition on an object."

But the proof of this compatibility

,
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was consequent upon specifying every object
either by descriptive
predicate or standard proper name. What if, as
Quine intended,
specification be construed as naming, exclusively;
and, furthermore,
a n ame of an object is any referring expression
(notably, any
descriptive phrase) which has that object as its
unique reference?
Then, in particular, the justificatory sentence
would seem to
imply the sentence: "If an open sentence of the form r
F^x~
1

expresses a genuine condition on an object, then that open
sentence is true or false of that object, even though the

object
is named by expressions that contingently denote
it."
Does this
last sentence express a proposition that is really
intuitive?
I think that it does, but that it is also possible,
consistently,

to affirm that proposition, without at the same time
affirming
the principle (0) which it is intended to justify.
I think

that it is possible, for example, consistently, to affirm
that "N(x is greater than five)" is true of the number of

planets, without at the same time affirming that "N(the number
of planets is greater than five)" is true, even where 'the
r

number of planets" is a name.
is found in

What

I

^

The rationale for this belief

5

do not claim

— and

what is certainly false

— is

that

any name of the value of a variable in an open sentence of the
form ^x" is suitable as an instantiation of that variable.
1

We must distinguish between instantiatable names and non—

instantiatable names.

Instantiatable names are precisely

those names which ne cessarily denote their objects.

That a

name which contingently denotes its object is not a valid

instantiation of a variable in an open sentence of the form
r

N^x

-1

can be accounted for as follows:

What our semantics says, intuitively, is that "(Ex)NFx"
is true

(in the actual world),

if and only if there is something

such that the open sentence "HFx" is true of it (in the actual

91

world), and this implies that there is
something such that the
open sentence "Fx" is true of it in_ every
world possible with

~

P e ct

actual w- orId (including the actual
world, since
" "
R is reflexive).
In short, "(Ex)NFx" is true, if and
only if
there is something such that it is F in every
logically possible
world. The truth of "(Ex)NFx" implies, therefore,
that the
value of its bound variable exists in every
logically possible
world; and this implies the necessary existence
of the value
£2.

of its bound variable.

As such, the quantifier "(Ex)”, whose

variable falls within the scope of "N», is to be
understood
as saying: "There is some necessarily existent
thing x such
that."
Now consider the problem of specifying an
object that
satisfies the open sentence "NFx". Let us suppose, contrary
to what I said earlier, that any name of the value
of "x" in
the open sentence "NFx" is admissible as an instantiation
of

that variable.

Let us suppose, therefore, that "NFx" is true

of some object, if there is some name such that replacing
its

free variable by that name would render "NFx" true (cf. Quine's
criterion (ii)). Then, if "NFa" is some true sentence, then
on the present supposition "NFx" is true of some object;

—

namely, the object denoted by "a".

But it can be shown that

this condition never holds in L^.
Case

NFa

1

(Ex)NFx
1

V ("NPa",w

)

I

2 V
3

I

("(Ex)NFx",w

V ("Fa" ,w
I

.

)

i

)

Assumption for reduotio
= 0

= 1

/i

0

4 I("a",w

.)
J

That is,

= 1

I

6 l("F",w

.)
J

/3

assigns to "a" in every world w., where w.Rw., some

member or other of D which is one of those elements assigned by
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I

to "F" in w

.

3

5

V ("(x)M~Fx",w

6

V II (»M~Fx”,w

7

V

(»-.Fx'*,w

I)
8 I' ("x",w

)

e

/2

= 1

)

)

= 1

)

;[

/5

= 1
I*

/6

("~F",w

3

/7

.)

3

That is, I» assigns to "~F" in some world w.,
where w.Rw.
i
i
every member of IK that i s also a. member of
n
^

i)

D.

e IK and I'("x",w^) 6 IK

(for I* ("x ,w.

)

(by definition of universal

generalizations), and I'("x",w

)

= I*("x»,w.)

(by (iF.l)).

Now it may appear that 4 and 8 conflict.
If everything
is a member of I'("~F",w.), then is not the
individual assigned
to "a" a member of I' ("~F" ,w )? Not necessarily,
for it
is,

after all, everything in D

that is a member of I'("~F",w.)-

Suppose that "Fa" is interpreted as "The author of Waver
ley
is an author." Then we may agree that "NFa" is true.
Now
we want to show that

"

(Ex)NFx"

— that

is,

"There is something

that is necessarily an author"— is not a consequence of our
premise.
If we are right, then the sentence, "Necessarily,
the author of Waver ley is an author," is compatible with
the sentence, "Everything is possibly not an author." Now

believe that both of these sentences have true, and hence
compatible, interpretations.
It is easy to imagine a world
in which none of us, including the author of Waver ley that
I

is,

Scott

— authors.

—

Call this world "w.".

Since,

in w.,*

3

3

none of us authors, and yet "The author of Waver ley is an
author" is true in w^, then "the author of Waver ley " does
not denote, in w., any of us (including, of course, the

author (in this world) of Waver ley )

Nothing in our semantics precludes this state of affairs;

for assignments to constants are liable to branching (by (IF.2)),
and it is possible that

u,

6 D

.

0

and u

4 D..
ic

i

The formal picture
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is this:

Suppose there are n elements in D
every member,
of D_^ is a member of
.

by

8,

'~ F "

every member, u^, ...,u
in w^.

1

I assigns to "a"

in

of

n,

That is, u ,**«,u

n

those elements assigned by

I

I)

.

.

Then,

is assigned by I» to

D_.

e I' ("~F" ,w

some member u

Then, by 7,

.

k

) .

Now, by 4,

of D which is one of

to "F" in w

That is, u e
But we cannot conclude that u^ £ I'("~F",w.),
3
for it is possible that u ft
Therefore,
k
Case 1 is invalid.
.

.

l("F",Wj).

The result is completely intuitive, for as
we explained
earlier, "NFx" is satisfiable only by something
that necessarily
exists ; that is, something that exists in every
logically possible
world.
It follows from the truth of "NFa"
that, in every
logically possible world, "a" denotes something
or other.
It does not follow from the truth of "NFa"
that something or
other is such that, in every logically possible
world, "a"
denotes it. But the latter, and not the former,

condition

is required before we can validly exchange
any occurrence of

"a" inside the scope of "N" for a free (bindable)
variable,
given the interpretation of "NFx".

Thus, in order to existentially generalize on "the author
of Waverley " in the sentence, "Necessarily, the author of

Waverley is an author," we require the added condition:
"There is something which is necessarily the author of Waver ley "
(in symbols,

"(Ex)N(x = a)").

Now

it' is

certain that the

sentence, "Necessarily, the author of Waverley is an author,

and there is something which is necessarily the author of
Waverley ," is not compatible with the sentence, "Everything
is possibly not an author;" for everything

,

in this instance,

must include an individual who, according to what was just
said, exists and authors in every logically possible world.
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The proof proceeds as follows:
Case 2

NFa & (Bx)U(x = a)

(Ex)NFx
4
1

V

I(

M NPa",w.

)

= 1

5

)

3 V

,

I(

'(Ex)NPx",w
i

)

= 0

)

Since Case 2 is exactly like Case 1
except for "(Ex)N(x = a ),'»
we may save some steps. By the attempted
proof of Case 1, we
derive

I("a",w

e l("F",w.)

)

J

and

I'("x",w

)

e I'("~F",w.)

3

As we saw. Case

J

is invalid, since it is possible that
I
assigns to "a" in w^. some member of D distinct from
every
1

member of D assigned by

I'

Case 2 is valid, then

assigns to "a" in

I

to "x" in

w^..

Consequently, if

w.. some member of
D not distinct from every member of D assigned by I' to
"x"
in Wj.
Line 2 of the proof should ensure this.

By definition:
Vj( (Ex)N(x = a)" ,w^ ) =

1

iff there is some sequence

such that
(a)

is like I except at "x"

I'

(b) I'("x",w.) e D.
(c) for any

and

if w^Rw..,

w^.,

Vj ("N(x = a)",w
,

i

=

)

then I'("x",w.) e

1

Hence
6 Vj,
7

,r

(

N(x = a)",w

V ,(-x = a”, Wj
T

8 I'("x",w

)

J

)

i

=

= 1

)

/2
/6

1

= I' ("a" ,w

.

0

)

/7

T)

I'
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Line 8 tells us that in every world
w., where w.Rw., I'
assigns to "a" one of the members of D
that I* assigns to
"x”. But I’("x",w.) 6 D. and P(V,w.)
6 D. (by (b) and
(c) of the definition above), and
I'("x",w.) = I'(" X ",w
)
(by (iP.l)).
Thus, the individual assigned to
"a" in w^
is some member u^ of D. that is also
a member of D
B^t
every member of IK, according to
5, is a member of I'("»«P",w.),
^
Consequently,
6 I’("~F",w.). But, by 4 u
l("F",w.)’.
,
k e
That is, one and the same individual is
both F and not P^
Wy But that is impossible. Therefore, Case 2 is
valid.
.

.

^

m

There can be no doubt that the following
inference
is valid, and a proof is omitted:
Case 3

MFa

(Ex)N(x = a)

&,

(Ex)MFx

However, we can show that "(Ex)H(x = a)" is not
only
sufficient, but necessary, as a condition for existentially

generalizing on "a" in "MPa".
If V ("(Ex)MPx",w
I

some w

,

i

where w.Rw..
x

J

J

= 1,

then V
It ("Fx",w^) = 1, for
That is, there is some world w *
)

.

alternative to w^, such that some member of D
also a member of IK is assigned to "F" in w^.

j

that is

.

(intuitively,

something in the actual world is P in some possible world
(not necessarily the actual world).)
Suppose that "MPa" states a sufficient condition for
the derivation of "(Ex)KFx".
If V ("KFa",w
= 1, then
I

V ("Fa",w

)

J

= 1, for some w

,

J

i

where w.Rw..
1

is some alternative possible world w.,

)

That is, there

J

such that I assigns

to "a" in w, one of those members of D that I assigns to

"F" in

w...

But it is possible that l("a",w

i

)

^

D.

"a" may not denote anything in the actual world.)

.

(intuitively,
Hence, the

truth of "MPa" does not ensure us that there is some world w.,
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alternative to v

such that a member of D. that
is also a
^
is assigned to "F" in w .

member of D

±

,

*3

1

*

Suppose that "(Ex)(x = a)”, in conjunction
with "MFa"
states a sufficient condition for the
derivation.
If
=
VjO'CExHx
a)",*.) = 1, then T ,(»i = a",w.) ==
I'

M
(

i

)

6

.

and henoe that

Hence,

1.

r

a",w

But it is possible that I'("x",w.)

Vj.h

;

= a",w.) = 0.

(intuitively, something
that exists in the actual world may not exist
in any other
world.) Clearly, the condition we seek still
eludes us.
Suppose that " (Ex)M(x = a)", in conjunction
with
"MFa",

states a sufficient condition for the derivation.
V ("(Ex)M(x = a)",w ) = 1, then V^O'x = a",w.)
=
];

If
1,

i

some Wj, where w^Rw...

alternative world w

for

Now we are assured that there is some
such that a member of D that is also a
.

3

member of

assigned in

3

is assigned the same element to which "a" is
w.

and

w...

However we have no assurance that

this world is one in which
"x"
(

I'

assigns to "a", and hence to

one of the elements (if any) which I' assigns to "F".
Ifi'ku i t ive ly , a exists in the actual world as
well as some
,

possible world, but this world may not be one in which a
(or anything else) is F.
Clearly, we are guaranteed that a is something in the
actual world which, in some possible world, is F, only if

we are guaranteed that a exists in this world as well as
the alternative worlds.

Hence the necessity as well as

the sufficiency of "(Ex)N(x = a)".

Our semantics therefore validates the following

existential generalization rule for the system

:
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and r (Ex)N(x = ajl, infer r
(Ex)fP, where
x is any individual variable, a is any
individual
(EOj)

From

a

constant,

and 01 is any wff containing an occurrence
of a inside the
scope of a single modal operator, and
(3 differs from a only
in that in one or more places where
ot contains a,
[3 contains
free x

As indicated, (EG^ applies to sentences
containing nonreiterated
modalities. Problems of reiterated modalities
are beyond the
scope of this thesis.

$4

A Semantics for an Epistemic Logic (L^

serves as a model for the contemplated
epistemic and
doxastic systems. The epistemic case is considered
next.

system will be called "Lg".
of

The

contains all primitive elements

Lp

except that "N" and "M" are replaced by the epistemic
operators "K" and "P". I shall deal with the simplified

case

of a single knower, who shall be called "Tom".

"K

"

and "P

t

"

t

may be read, respectively, as "Tom knows that" and "it is
possible, for all that Tom knows, that." More accurately,
however, »K " should be read as "it is a logical consequence
t

of what Tom knows that" (see (K) below).

The semantics for
by:

results from the semantics for

redefining "R" as a dyadic reflexive and transitive
relation defined over the members of W; and (2) replacing,
(1)

in rules 1 through 7, every occurrence of

occurrence of "M" by "P^"

,

"17"

by "K

"

every

and every occurrence of "modal"

by "epistemic."
Consequently,
in L^.

(K)

(II) and (12) are valid, and (1) is invalid,

Similarly, the correlate of (N):
If

Ct

is a theorem,

then

r

*K^oT is a theorem
l
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is validity-preserving in

"V

1

^.

((K) is unexceptionable
if

iS interpreted as -it is a
logical consequence of what

Tom knows that.")

Consequently, the attempted proof
and the proof of
Case 1

K Pa

•

t

(Ex)K Fx
t

and
Case 2

K Fa

>

t

J:

(Ex)K (x = a)
t

(Ex)K^Fx

follow the same steps as those of
Case 1 and Case 2, respectively,
the appropriate operator substitutions
having been made.
We can also demonstrate, by an
argument analogous to
one presented in §3, that ”(Ex)K (x = a)”
states a necessary
t
and sufficient condition for existentially
generalizing on "a"
in the sentence

H

P Fa".
X

Thus, the semantics validates the following
existential
generalization rule for the system L^:
and r (Ex)K (x = a)" , infer r (Ex) g'', where
t
x is any individual variable, a is any individual
constant,
(E0

and

2

)

From

a

1

J

is any wff containing an occurrence of a inside
the
scope of a single epistemic operator, and
differs from
OC

only in that in one or more places where
contains free x

in

Oc

contains a,

Oc

@

As the preceding discussion verifies, logical implications
are exactly those of L^, given uniform substitution of

"W" for "K

"
t

and "M" for "P

"

t

throughout.

Nevertheless, the

two sets of formulas clearly have different meanings.

One way

to understand this difference in meaning is to understand the

difference in the meaning of an "alternative world" in each
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semantical theory (where a world w. is
alternative to a world
w^, if w^Rw^).

An alternative world in epistemic logic,
unlike modal
logic, is not simply any world possible
with respect to the
base world (intuitively, the actual world). It

is quickly
seen that if this were the case, then, by
all and only
logically necessary truths are known, a consequence

that is

surely unacceptable, from an intuitive point of
view.
notion of an alternative world in epistemic logic

The

is rather
that of any world possible with respect to what
someone or
other knows (in the actual world). In our simplified
system,
we are concerned only with what the person Tom knows
and

does not know.

We might call the alternative worlds in our

logic

t— epistemically possible worlds” (worlds possible
with
respect to what Tom knows (in the actual world)). Clearly,

the set of all t-epistemically possible worlds is a proper
subset of the set of all logically possible worlds.

Intuitively, then, what our semantics says is that
"

(Ex)K^.Px” is true,

if and only if there is something such

that it is P in every t-epistemically possible world. The
truth of " (Ex)K Fx” implies, therefore, that the value of
t

its bound variable exists in every t-epistemically possible
world; and this implies the known (to Tom) existence of
the value of its bound variable.

As such, the quantifier

"(Ex)”, whose variable falls within the scope of ”K

should be understood as saying something likes

something

x,

whose identity Tom knows

,

”,

’’There

is

such that.”

Proceeding to the problem of specifying an object that
satisfies the open sentence "K^Fx”

,

we find that the situation

is analogous to that described in §3.

In brief,

if a name "a”

is suitable as an instantiation of the variable in the open

sentence ”K Fx”, then there is something such that, in every
t
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t—epistemically possible world, »a" denotes
it; in symbols,
H (Ex)K
(x = a)" .
t

§5 A Dilemma

of Quine s Resolved
1

Enough has been said to substantiate that
the following
inference is valid in L-^
Case 4

NFa & (Ex)N(x = a)

(Ex)(N(x = a) & RFx)
But the proof follows:
1

2

V ("NFa"

,w

=

)

.

1

V ("(Bx)N(x = a)",v

3

V

,,

I

(

(Bx)(W(x

= a)

= 1

)

I

Assumption for reductio

& KPx) ,w
,,

i

4 V^(" (x) (~N(x = a)
5

Vj

6

Either

,,
l

(

~N‘(x = a)

~NFx)",w.

v

~NFx ,w^) =
,,

v

Vj ("~K(x = a)",w
t

)

= 0

)

)

= 1

1

/5

Vj,

,,

(

-NFx",w
i

(' ,

I1

= 1

)

a)% Wl )

Vj.O'Ntx =

8 V

/4

= 1

or

7

/3

-UFx",w.) =

= 1

/2
/6,7

1

But 1, 7, and 8 are jointly impossible, for they imply that
some individual is both F and not F in some logically possible

world.

note that Hintikka's semantics, in "Existential

I

Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions,"^ validates
the corresponding arbitrary formula:
r (NFa & (Ex)N(x = a))
(1)
(2)
(3)

rNPa n
r

e

/J.

6

= a)

L RFx)"

1

Q

(Ex)N(x = a)

r (x)(M(x

d (Ex)(N(x

/ x)

-1

e
v

Assumption for reductio

li

-NPx)

-1

£

JJ.
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.

(4)

rM
(

(5)

r ~M(a.

(6)

^NFa" e

a.)

v

/ a)

~NFa) n £

from (3) by (c.t^)

fl

-1

e

fJL

(C.self=/)

1

}JL

/4,5

But (1) and (6) violate (c.~).

Based upon what was said in
§4, it follows that the analogue
of Case 4 is valid in
:

Case

4'

K Fa & (Ex)K (x = a)
t
t

(Ex)(K (x = a) & K Fx)
t
t

Now it will be noted that "(Ex)n(x = a)"
and "(Ex)K (x = a)"
both imply, in their respective systems,
"(Ex)(x = a)". This
is so, since "R" (the alternativeness
relation) is reflexive
in
and
The implication is provable as follows: If
r
V ( (Ex)
(x = a)' ,w ) = 1, then, for some I', V
r x = a. n
I
,w.)
t
i
I ,(
= 1, for every w
where
w.Hw^. But w.Rw., Hence, V
j(
(^ = a3,w.)
= 1. Hence, by definition, V r (Ei)(x = a)"
(
,*.) = 1. Therefore/
I
since Case 4 and Case 4' are valid, so too are:

A

1

1

Case 5

NFa & (Ex)N(x = a)
(Ex) (x = a L NFx)

and
Case 5*

K Pa & (Ex)K (x = a)
t
t

(Ex) (x = a & E Fx)
t

The preceding results are not very startling, but they
are useful in helping us to resolve a familiar kind of dilemma
posed by Quine, which has important bearing on the question of
the meaningfulness of ref erentially opaque open sentences.

From "Reference and Modality":
(15) 9 is necessarily greater than 7
(18) The numoer of planets is necessarily greater than 7
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(24) The number of planets = 9

(30)

(Ex)(x is necessarily greater than

¥hat is this
greater than
inferred, it
suppose this

7

)

number which, according to
(30), is necessarily
7? According to ( 15 ), from which
(30) was
was 9 that is, the number of planets;
but to
would conflict with the fact that
4
(18) is false
,

.

Prom such dilemmas as this one, Quine derives
support for
his contention that ref erentially opaque open
sentences
do not

express genuine conditions on objects and are
therefore meaningless.
He concludes that since "the number of planets"
is not validly
substitutive for "9" in ( 15 ), given 24
(
), the open sentence,
'

"x is necessarily greater than

7 ,"

is not true or false of any

number at all.
But Quine's inference is invalid, insofar as
( 15 ),
(18),
(24), and (30) are interpreted sentences of any modal logic.

Specifically, in 1^, (15) and (24) do not imply
(18); yet
the conditions under which "x is necessarily greater than

7

"

is true or false of an object are precisely defined in the

semantics.

Unless these conditions are objectionable from
an intuitive point of view and I have endeavored to establish

—

the contrary

— the

principle

(

0 ) must be regarded as false.

I said in Chapter IV,
§ 4,

that (0) was intuitively

justified by a kind of sentence that one finds in various
places in Quine's writings; namely:

"If an open sentence

expresses a genuine condition on an object, then that open
sentence is true or false of that object, no matter how the
object is specified."
a proposition that

is.

I

believe that this sentence expresses

genuinely intuitive, even where (l)

"specification" is construed as naming, exclusively, and
(2) a name of an object is any referring expression which

has that object as its unique reference.
that (0) is false.

Therefore,

I

But

I

have argued

am committed to the belief
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that it is possible that an open sentence
expresses a genuine
condition on an object and is therefore
true or false of that
object, no matter how the object is named,
although
some of

these names are not valid instantiations
of the free variable
of that open sentence. This belief
requires a rationale that
I can now provide, thereby resolving
Quine-like dilemmas of
the kind illustrated above.

Specifically with regard to 1^, I am committed
to the
belief that an open sentence of the form r Nfe~
r
1

or

K£x~'

expresses a genuine condition on an object and
is therefore
true or false of that object, even though the
object
is

named by expressions that cont ingently denote it.
name a's contingently denoting its object, it
is

By a

meant that
the name satisfies the condition r (Ex)(x =
1
a)* but does not
satisfy the condition r (Ex)N(x = a)" . It is not
true, as
1

we know, that a name which contingently denotes its
object
can be validly generalized on (instantiated to) inside
the
scope of a modal operator.
Nevertheless, the value of a

variable is denoted as truly by a name that is not generalizable
on as by a name that is generalizable on. Thus, the object
that make s
(1)

(Ex)N(x is greater than 7)

true is the number of planets if it is nine.

But this

assertion does not commit us to the truth of
(2)

N(the number of planets is greater than 7),

even though we be committed to the truth of
(3)

N(9 is greater than 7)

and
(4)

The number of planets = 9;
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for (0) does not hold for

Ve have nevertheless the means
to render intelligible, within L
p the identity of the number
of planets with the object that makes
(1) true.
These means
take the form of a sentence that is
implied, in L
by

any

premise that implies

(1

)

by the rule (EOj).

Suppose this

premise is

N(9 is greater than 7) & (Ex)N(x =
9 ).

(5)

Then, since Case
(

6

is valid,

(5) validly implies,

in L

,

(Ex)(x = 9 & N(x is greater than 7)).

)

But

5

,,

9" is free from the scope of any modal
operators in

(

6

)

and consequently occurs purely referentially in
in the
( 6 ),
sense of (Def 5). This enables us to infer, in
.

,

(7)

(Ex) (x = the number of planets & N(x is greater
than 7 ))

from (6) and

(

4 ).

Quite straightforwardly, then,

(

7

)

identifies

the object which is necessarily greater than

7 as the number
of planets, without implying the untoward consequence
( 2 ).

The same maneuver works within

dilemmas for epistemic logic.

resolving Quine-like

An example of a valid conclusion

might be
(8)

(Ex) (x = the approaching man
&

Aristotle

is

musica1

))

from the premises,
(9)

K
(Corisou3 ls "“Sisal) &
Aristotle

(

Ex ) K

Ar istotl e

(x “ Coriscus)

and
(

10 ) The approaching man = Coriscus.

Although "the approaching man" is a name by which Aristotle
does not know Coriscus, if the open sentence, "K

(x is

Aristotle
musical)," is true of Coriscus, then it is true of the approaching
man, they being identical.

Again, we are not committed to the
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consequence

O1

K
the a PPr°aching nan is musical).
Aristotle^
The same maneuver works within L
resolving Quine-like
dilemmas for doxastic logic, as may now be
seen.
)

y

A Semantics for a Doxastic Logic (L^)

f 6

The doxastic case will now be considered.
The system will
be called "Ly .
contains all primitive elements of L,,
except
that "N" and "M" are replaced by the doxastic
operators "B" and
Again, we deal with the simplified case of a
single
believer, who again shall be called "Tom". "By
and "C "
may be read, respectively, as "Tom believes that"
and "it is
compatible with all that Tom believes that." More
accurately,
C

.

"By

however,

should be read as "it is a logical consequence
of what Tom believes that" (see (b) below).
The semantics for

by:

results from the semantics for

redefining "R" as a dyadic transitive relation
defined over the members of W; and ( 2 ) replacing, in rules
(l)

through

every occurrence of "N" by "By, every occurrence
of "M" by "Cy
and every occurrence of "modal" by "doxastic."
1

7,

,

Consequently,
in L^.

(II) and (12) are valid, and (l) is invalid,

Similarly, the correlate of (N):

(B)

a

If

then r B

is a theorem,

is validity-preserving in

t

oT'

is a theorem

.

Consequently, the attempted proof and the proof of
Case

1

1

'

B Fa
X

(Ex)Byx
and
Case 2

1

B Fa
X

&.

(Ex)B (x = a)
X

(Ex)Byx
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follow the same steps as those of Case
1 and Case
2, respectively,
the appropriate operator substitutions
having been made.
(For
further discussion of Case 2", see below.)
We can also demonstrate, by an
argument analogous to one
presented in $ 3 , that »(Ez)B (x = a)" states
a necessary and
t
sufficient condition for existentially
generalizing on

"a" in

the sentence "C,Fa".
X

Thus, the semantics validates the following
existential
general izat ion rule for the system
:

From 0c and r (Ex)B (x = a)"', infer ‘(Ex)^,
where
3a )
t
X is any individual variable, a. is any individual
constant,
(EG

and

is any wff containing an occurrence of a
inside the
scope of a single doxaatic operator, and
differs
0c

from

{3

only in that in one or more places where
contains free x

Oc.

contains

a,

Qt

ft

The meanings of doxastic formulas, like epistemic
formulas,
may be explained via the notion of an alternative world
in

doxastic logic.

Specifically, we might call the alternative
worlds of our doxastic logic "t-doxastically possible worlds"
(worlds possible with respect to what Tom believes (in the
actual world)).

Intuitively, what our semantics says is that "(Ex)B Fx"
X
is true, if and only if there is something such that it is

F in every t-doxastically possible world.

The truth of

"(Ex)B Fx" implies, therefore, that the value of its bound
t
variable exists in every t-doxastically possible world; and
this implies the believed (by Tom) existence of the value
of its bound variable.

As such, the quantifier "(Ex)", whose

variable falls within the scope of "B^", should be understood
as saying something like:

identity Tom has a belief

"There is something x, about whose
,

such that."
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Proceeding to the problem of specifying
an object that
satisfies the open sentence "B Fx«, we
find that the situation
t
is analogous to that described in
3
In
$

"a" is

brief, if a name

.

citable as an instantiation

of the variable in the
open sentence "B^’x", then there is
something such that, in
every t-doxastically possible world, -a”
denotes it; in symbols
" (Ex)B (x = a)".
t
I note

that in some logical systems, Case 2''
is invalid.
The invalidity is held to turn on the irref
lexivity of doxastic
operators. But it will be observed that that
the proof of
Case 2 depends in no way upon the ref lexivity
of R in L^.
Furthermore, Case 2
seems thoroughly intuitive, whether "a"
*

*

denotes anything in the actual world or not. Suppose
"Pa"
is read as "Sherlock Holmes is a great detective."
Then
what the premise of Case 2" says is: "Tom believes
that

Sherlock Holmes is a great detective, and there is someone
whom Tom believes (mistakenly) to be Sherlock Holmes." This
sentence seems to imply, unequivocally;

"There is someone

whom Tom believes to be a great detective."

The premise

ensures that in every world compatible with what Tom believes,
"Sherlock Holmes" names some existent individual. Consequently,
any world in which "Sherlock Holmes" does not name an existent
individual (the actual world and other possible worlds) is not
a world compatible with what Tom believes.

Nevertheless, I

concede a certain perversity in saying that we have here
existentially generalized on "Sherlock Holmes." In the end,
we may wish to refer to the rule (EG,
jd.

)

otherwise than as

an EG rule
Irref lexivity comes into play when we consider the doxastic

correlate of Case 5*
Case 5

'

B^Fa

fic

(Ex)B^.(x = a)

(Ex)(x = a

fic

B^Fx)
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Of course it is not acceptable that
our premise, in the
paragraph above, should have the consequence
that there is
someone identical with Sherlock Holmes
whom Tom believes to
be a great detective. But Case 5"
is invalid in the semantics,
for the reason that »(Ex)B (x = a)"
does not imply ..( Ex x „
t
a) „.
)(
This is so because, from the fact
rx =
that V
a
If

~V

(

)

= 1

for every w^, where wJlw.., we cannot
infer that V
(^x = a n ,w
1; since R is not reflexive (that is,
it is no/true
,

)

that

W

i^i

^ *

The semantical requirement for validly
inferring
"(Ex)(x = a & B Fx)» by existential generalization
is that
t
the constant "a" be assigned in the base
world as well as
in every alternative to the base world,
some individual in
the domain of that world. This
requirement is fulfilled
,

by

(Ex)(x

a

&

(x = a))".

Thus, the semantics validates
t
the following existential generalization rule
for L :
fl

3

(EG
From Oc
3b )
r (Ex)(x =
a & /3)~

and r (Ex)(x = a & B (x = a))"
t

1

,

infer

1

where x is any individual variable, a is
any individual constant, and Oc is any wff containing
an

occurrence of

and
Oc

f

inside the scope of a single doxastic operator,
differs from Oc only in that in one or more places where

{3

contains a,

§ 7

a.

/3

contains free x

Truth Conditions for Existential Quantifications
in Lj

,

Lpy and L
3

The key to truth conditions for existential
quantifications
in Lp Ly and Ly as well as to criteria of
meaningfulness of

open sentences in these languages, lies in their EG rules.
Truth conditions for existential quantifications in

may be put as follows:

i
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(v)

An existential quantification
holds in L

if there
is a constant a whose substitution
for the variable of
quantification would render the matrix
true, and, if the
variable of quantification occurs
anywhere in the matrix
inside the scope of a single modal
operator, then
r
n
(Ex)N(x = a)
is true.

A statement of truth conditions for
existential quantifications
resu
lts "by replacing, in (v), every
^2
occurrence of "L " by
ever y occurrence of "modal'* by
"epistemic", and everj
"V»
occurrence of "F* by "K ". The resulting

statement is (vi).
t
The doxastic case is somewhat more
complicated, owing to
the case of quantifications of the form r
(Ex)(x = a & 0)1, wher e
contains
free
x inside the scope of a doxastic
/3
operator. The
result of substituting some constant a for
the variable of

quantification may render the matrix true; but
the conjunction
of this closed formula with r (Ex)B (x =
a)“» does

not provide
t
a sufficient condition for the inference
of a quantification
of the previously mentioned form. For any
sentence of the
form r a = a" is true, by (II), whether a denotes
1

anything in

the actual world or not.

Thus, using the illustration of

§ 6,

we may assume the truth of the sentences:

"Sherlock Holmes =
Sherlock Holmes, and Tom believes that Sherlock Holmes
is a
great detective" ("a = a & B^Fa" and "There is someone
)
whom

Tom believes to be Sherlock Holmes" ("(Ex)B (x = a)").
But
these sentences do not imply, in L^, the sentence:
"There
someone identical with Sherlock Holmes whom Tom believes
to be a great detective" ("(Ex)(x = a & B Fx)").
is

t

Truth conditions for existential quantifications in
may be put as follows:
(vii) An existential quantif icat ion holds in

there is a constant

si

if

whose substitution for the variable
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of quantification would render
the matrix true, and
(a) if the variable of quantification

occurs anyone
in the matrix inside but not outside
the scope of a
single doxastic operator, then r
(Ex)B (x = a)" is true,
t
or (b) if the variable of
quantification occurs anywhere
in the matrix both inside and
outside the scope of a
1

single doxastic operator, then r (Ex)(x =
a
is true

J 8

i.

B (x « a )p

Criteria of the Meaningfulness of Open
Sentences
i

1*2

»

and L
-

Quine’s principle (o) says, in effect, that, if
and only
if a sentence <£a passes the (unrestricted)
substitutivity test,
does the truth of#a_ imply the satisfiability of
<£x.
In other
words, a name is a valid instantiation of a free
variable of
any meaningful (satisf iable ) open sentence, if and
only if the
name can be validly substituted for any other name,
in accordance
with the rule (SI ). This bicondition simply does not
hold in
Q
general.
It has been shown that a name a is a valid
instantiation
of some open sentences in L^, L^, and L^, whenever
certain

existence conditions are satisfied; namely, those given by
(ExjN(x = _a)~’, r (Ex)K^.(3c = ja)"" , r (Ex)B^.(x^ = aj -1 and
n
-1
(Ex) (x = a
B (x = a))
1

,

fie

t

.

Nevertheless, an analogue to Quine's (0) is constructable
for each of our languages, and one may indeed use these analogues
as criteria of the meaningfulness of open sentences in these

languages, although they are of more formal than intuitive

interest
Again, the modal case will serve as our model:
(0

L

)

Every meaningful open sentence <Px of
1^ is interpretable
in L

Ill

where
(Def. 9)

An open sentence

is interpre table in
L

only if:

and.

Case 1:

1

,

if

If i does not occur
inside the scope

of any modal operator,

then 2>x is ref erentially

transparent (see (Def. 6)).
Case 2:
If x occurs inside the
scope of a
single modal operator, then, for
all names a

^=

if

and£a
(0
"L

l"

L^

by

resultB

V’

r

1

k"

,

(Ex)N(x = a)"

1

are all true, then

,

and
r (Ex)N(x= b)l,

is true.

replacing, in (0 ), every occurrence
of
where a definition of interpretabili tv in
l
>>y

results by replacing, in (Def.
9)> every occurrence of "modal”
by "epistemic" and every occurrence of "N"
by "K "
The
resulting definition is (Def. 10).
.

Again, the analogue for

is more complicated to state:

re3 ults by replacing, in
(0^
1
by "L ", where

),

every occurrence of »I»
1
.

3

(Def. 11)

An open sentence <}>x

is interpretable

in

,

if

and only if:
Case 1:

If x does not occur inside the scope

of any doxastic operator,

then

is referentially

transparent
Case 2:

•

If 1 occurs inside but not outside the

scope of a single doxastic operator, then, for
all names a and b, if n a = b~\ r (Ex)B (x = a)" 1
,
t
r
(Ex)B (x = b)*1 , and ^a are all true, then $b
t
is true

Case 3:

If x occurs both inside and outside

the scope of a single doxastic operator, then,
for all names a and b, if r a = b" r (Ex)(x = a
1

,
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& B

#a

t

(x = a))->, r (Ex) (x = b & B
(x = b))-\ and
t

are all true, then

Instances of Case

is true.

2 of

(Bef. 11), involving nondenoting
names, may occur when a and b are
identical constants.
1

Intuitively, what the definitions of
interpretability in
L -L tell us is that a name b must have
the same reference
x
3
as a name a in every relevant world before
we can validly
substitute b for a in any substitution instance
of any open
sentence in any of the languages. Formally,
the picture

(greatly simplified) for all cases other than the
ref erentially
transparent case is this: If r a = b" is true in w.
then,
by /yjzJt some member of D (not necessarily
1^) is assigned
,

to both a and

in w^.

But if the existence conditions hold,
by results with which we are by now familiar
there is
b_

—

then

some member u

of

such that u

k
in every world w
^

assigned to
11)).
of

of

_b

and

ji

b_

is assigned to both a and
k
(not necessarily w.), where w.Rw. (u is
^
l
k
j
in w^ in every case except Case 2 of (Def.

Consequently, for any predicate letter F to which the value
is assigned in any world w., where w.Rw., the value
(u
k)
/

\

(u,

)

K

“3

is assigned to F in w

5 9

J

J

.

Analogues in Kaplan*

s

*'

Quantifying In"

In "Quantifying In," 5 David Kaplan proposes as an analysis
of the sentence
(1)

There is something x such that, necessarily, x is greater
than five

the sentence
(2)

(Ex)(Ea.)

(

A

N

(a_>

In this formulation,

x ) & N r aL is greater than five”

1

"A"

)

is a dyadic predicate, with

"

A (a

,

x)"
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reading "a denotes x.»

The subscripted symbol "N" stands
for
the adverb "necessarily,- with " A^" reading
"denotes necessarily.
The symbols " r " and " n " are, for all practical
purposes,

Quine's quasi-quotation marks.

The second occurrence of "N"
is therefore an occurrence of a one-place
predicate, to be

read "is necessary."
(Kaplan uses

Other symbols are by now familiar

where

I

use "a").

(2) is not an example of quantification into an opaque

context in the usual sense that a variable x occurs within
and without an opaque context. Kaplan's formulation is
Pregean
in spirit, and as we have already noted (Chapter III,
$12),

quantification into opaque contexts, in the usual sense, is
impossible within Frege's theory. Although it is true that
(2) is an instance of quantification into an opaque context,
it is not true that

(

2

)

is open to Quine's charge of

meaninglessness; for the open sentence
is referentially transparent.
1

2

(Ex)
(Eji)

3 The

(Esl)
(

(

A ^(a, x)

A ^(a., nine

"A N (...

x

..

V'
’

To illustrate:

& N r a is greater than five"

1

& N r a is greater than five”

)-

1

)

)

number of planets = nine

imply
4 (Ea)

(

(a_,

N
than five"

the number of planets) & N r a_ is greater

1

)

On the other hand, the open sentence
not referentially transparent.

"

A^

(

• • •

j*

. .

)"

is

Consonant with Frege's theory,

all referring expressions which have unique references are

construed as names; but in the absence of any mark distinguishing
standard from nonstandard referential occurrences of names,
it is easy to show that (SI^) is invalid:
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jj("nine" , x) & N r nine is greater than
five”1
6 The number of planets = nine

(Ex)

5

(

A

)

do not imply

(Ex)(A

("the number of planets",
r
x) & N the number
N
of planets is greater than five"
)

7

1

But

7

is no paradox, for as Quine has said,

"the principle of

substitutivity /[SI }7 should not be extended to
contexts
(>
in which the name to be supplanted occurs without
referring
simply to the object;" 6 and clearly, in its first
occurrence
in 5 ( as well as its second), "nine" does not refer
to the

object nine.

Nor is there any reason to believe that open
sentences, whose variables range over expressions, are
meaningless

because they are referentially opaque.

Having established that (2) is unobjectionable from the
point of view of the transparency and opacity of its open
sentences, it remains to be shown that (2) does indeed formulate
(l).
Equally unobjectionable from the point of view of the

transparency and opacity of its open sentences is the similar
sentence
(3)

(Ex)(EaJ(A

(cl,

x)

& N r_a is greater than five"1

).

But it can be shown that sentences of the general form,
(4)

There is something x such that, necessarily, ... x ...,

are not analyzable as sentences of the general form,
(5)

(Ex)(Ea)(

A

(a,x) & N r ... a ... n

).

For to satisfy (5), a name occurring within a modal context

need simply denote its object.
(6)

(Ex)(

is true

;

A ("Scott", x)

hence

&.

But

-1
N rScott = Scott

)
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(

7

(Ex)(Ea)(

)

is true.

A

(a,x) & N r a = Scott"

1

)

But

There is something x such that, necessarily,
x = Scott

(8)

is false,

since

(8) asserts that Scott necessarily exists.

Kaplan's analysis of sentences of the
general form (4)
implies a relation between the value of its
bound variable
and some name of the object. He concludes that
the

correct

analysis of sentences of the form (4) implies that
this
relation is one of necessary denotation. In other

words,

any name a on which we generalize to obtain a sentence
that
is an analysis of some sentence of the form
must satisfy
(4)

the condition
"

"

(Ex)

(a,x)", and not merely the condition
N

(Ex) A (a,x)".

Hence, the correct analysis of (8), according to Kaplan,
is
(

(Ex)(Ea)(

9)

If

(

A

(a,x) & N r a = Scott”

1

N

9 ) is the correct analysis of (8),

).

then there is no name

such that instantiating the open sentence

"A

to that name results in a true sentence.

But of course no

(... a ...)'*

such name exists; for if an object doss not necessarily exist,
then no name necessarily denotes it.
Clearly, Kaplan's conclusions are intimately related to
our conclusions in §§2 and 3, concerning the language

.

In particular, we saw there that any object that satisfies

the open sentence "UFx" necessarily exists, and that any

name "a" to which we can validly instantiate that open sentence

must satisfy the condition "(Ex)N(x = a)", and not merely the

condition "(Ex)(x = a)".
By an argument similar to one just given, it can be seen
that sentences of the general form,
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(Ex)(Ea)( A (a,x) & Tom B r ... a

(10)

),

are inadequate as analyses of sentences
of the general form,

There is something x such that Tom
believes that*

(11)

• • •

-A-

•

•

• •

(in (10),

"B" is a dyadic predicate, to be read
"believes".)
Let us assume the truth of

(Ex)(A ("the oldest spy", x ) & Tom B r the oldest spy

(12)

"

is a spy

Hence

(Ex)(Ea)(A( a_, x) & Tom B r a_

(13)

is true,

on our assumption.

"
is a spy

1

)

But

There is someone x such that Tom believes that
x is a spy

(14)

is false,

if

Tom has no belief concerning the identity of the

oldest spy.

Tom's having a belief about a thing's identity is,
generally
speaking, the condition that must be fulfilled before we can

validly infer, on Kaplan's analysis, a sentence of the general
form (11).
shall not explore the intricacies of Kaplan's attempts
to achieve philosophical clarity about this condition.
But,
I

again, it is clear that the condition in question, which he

represents by
(15)

(Ex) (Ea)R(ji, x,Tom)

has its analogue, in L^, in the form of the sentence,
(16)

(Ex)(x = a & B^.(x = a)).

Kaplan explains

(

15

)

as follows:

£kj

I will say
represents x to /Tom/ (symbolized:
/yR(ct,x,Tom )j|J7) if and only if (i) £aT_/ ienotes x,
(ii ) ~Va_7 is a name of x for ^om 77 and (iii)
is sufficiently vivid. 7

...

1

)
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In the above account,
in L

(i) has Its analogous formal
representation

in the sentence "(Ex)(x = a)".

The sentences are analogous
at best, for formulas of Lj contain no
variables over names.
But talk of denotation can be replaced
by talk of identity of
named objects, since "a" denotes x just in
case a is identical
3

'

with X.

m

Ly

(ii) and (iii) may be thought of as
jointly represented
on the present analogy, by "(Ex)B (x =
a)". That is,
t

we may regard "(Ex)B (x = a)" as true, just
in case "a" is
t
name of x for Tom, and "a” is Tom's vivid name

’a

of x.

In Hintikka's metaphor, "R(a,x,Tom)» can be
thought of
as true, just in case a denotes x, and Tom has
placed the
bearer of a among the leading characters of his inner
story.

Exchanging one metaphor for another, we can say that
"Ufa, x, Tom )"
is true, just in case a, refers to an object in this
world and
in every world compatible with Tom's beliefs (where all
worlds

compatible with Tom's beliefs comprise Tom's "inner story").
Contingent Identity

In the system L^, the theorem schema,
(12

r (x)(^)(x

)

variables and

ot

and

=
f2

£ D

(Cc

O

n
f3))

where x and

,

are any wffs, and

in one or more places where

Cc

Cc

has free x,

and
(3

(3

£

are any individual

differ only in that

has free

is valid; whereas the schema,
(^)Oc

(^)

and

Cc

and

/3

place where
(cf.

D j3

,

where x and

are any wffs, and
Oc

has free x,

(EGq)), is invalid.

reverse is the case.
since the schema:

[3

Oc

are any individual variables

^

and

j3

has free

differ only in that in every

£

Consider a modal logic in which the

The language is ref erentially opaque,
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ra - b

(1)

constants and

a

D

(oc

and

/3

D

n

where a and b are any individual
are any wffs, and a and
differ only in
/3)

,

that in one or more places where

Cx.

contains £,

contains h

(cf.

(SI )), is invalid in the language.
In such a language
0
the proof in Quine's hypothesized modal logic
(Chapter IV, ^2)
is formally valid up to and including line
5:

(Ex)(Ey)(x = y

(N(x = morning star)

•

•

~N(y = morning star))

But the contradiction in that proof is avoided, since,
given
the non-theoremhood of (12), we cannot derive line 6:
(x)(y)(* = 7

D

(N(x = morning star)

D N(y

= morning star))

In modal systems in which (12) is a theorem schema we can
derive the theorem:

(Nl)

x = y

D N(x

= y)

which says, in effect, that all identities are necessary. It
is to block the derivation of this theorem and its contrapositive
that some logicians introduce a restriction on (12 ):
(Cl)

r (x)(£)(x = v

variables and 0( and

(qc

D

)”
^0)

1

,

where x and

£

are any individual

are any wffs differing only in that in one

j

or more places where Oe has free x, not occurring within the scope
of

_a

modal operator

,

[3

has free

Modal systems in which (12) is not a theorem schema, but (Cl)
is a theorem schema, are called "contingent identity" systems.
It seems to me

— and

I

shall try to show it

identity systems are conceived in sin:

— that

8

contingent

the sin of confusing

the semantical role of variables with that of constants.

Constants in L-^-L^, as is by now evident, play a semantical
role comparable to that of predicate letters.

An n-ary predicate

letter is assigned a set of ordered n-tuples of members of

I)

in a world; and it is possible that the set to which a predicate
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letter is assigned in some world v is
not identical with
±
the set to which it is assigned in
another world w. (otherwise,
every atomic formula of the systems is
logically
true or

logically false).
a member of

to which

In a similar way, a constant
is assigned

Din

a world; and it is possible
that the individual
a constant is assigned in some world
w. is not identical

with the individual to which it
W

is

assigned in another world

But

is a se rious confusion to suppose
that variables
can play the role of constants. One
consequence of

y

such a

supposition is that some instances of quantification
into
opaque contexts are either false (under
customary interpretations
of syntax) or have some unintended sense,
if intelligible.
Imagine a system in which
(M~I)

(Ex)(By)(x = y & M~(x = y))

is formally consistent, and you have a contingent
identity

system.

Now try to imagine what (M~I) means.

As we customarily

interpret quantifiers and variables,

(M~I) asserts:
"There
is something which is identical with itself, but
it is possible
that it is not identical with itself." Clearly, the mind

boggles at such a reading.

The plausible conclusion to draw,

in view of this mind-boggling reading of (M~l), is that this
is not the way the authors of contingent identity systems

read (M~l).

But how do they read (M~l)?

Note that examples of so-called "contingent identities,"

which have led to the introduction of restrictions on (12),
are examples involving name
:

(2)

The morning star is identical with the evening star,
but it is possible that the morning star is not identical

with the evening star,

120

(

3

)

The number of planets is identical with nine,
but it
is possible that the number of planets is
not

identical

with nine,

and so on.

Now note how these sentences, which have true
interpretations, differ from the following sentence,
which
is false under any interpretation:
(

4)

The morning star is identical with the evening star,
l^ut it is possible that the first—mentioned
star is
not identical with the second-mentioned star.

What distinguishes (4) from (2) is antecedent reference back
(reference back to something referred to antecedently). This
is a feature of (4) as well as (M~l); and formalization of

(4),

in L^, would take the form of
(

5

)

(Ex) (Ey ) (a =

b& x= a&

y =

b&

M~(x = y))

which of course implies (M~l).
Antecedent reference back is effected, in first-order
logic, by binding variables

:

The value of x in any free

occurrence outside the quantifier in any sentence of the form
r (Ex)C? is that antecedently
referred to by the quantifier
r (Ex)” .
When we truly assert (2), the second occurrences of
1

"the morning star" and "the evening star" are not occurrences
of antecedent references back.

(2) is true,

intuition dictates,

because "the morning star," in its second occurrence, need not

refer to the same object as that referred to by "the morning
star," in its first occurrence.
In some semantical theories for modal systems, this

intuitive way of looking at occurrences of names in modal
contexts is given formal implementation by having constants

assigned objects, in worlds, and allowing the possibility
of different assignments in different worlds.

Now contingent
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identity systems make the same provision,
but for variables
as well as constants.
But, as I shall presently
demonstrate,
you cannot (l) make assignments. to variables
relative

to worlds,
(2) allow the possibility of different assignments
in different'
worlds, and (3) effect antecedent reference
back on the part

of every variable occurring inside the
scope of a modal operator
as well as inside a quantifier outside the
scope of that operator.

A model-theoretic treatment of (M~I), like those
developed
in this chapter, yields:
V ("(Ex)(Ey)(x = y & M~(x - y))“,w
= 1
I
i)
2 V
("x = y L M~(x = y)",w..) =1
If
1

3

u

V If ("x = y ,w )
i

=1

That is,

("~(x = y)",w..) =

I*

/2

1

/4

assigns to »x" and "y" in w

and it is false that
Wj, where WjRw

,

I'

/i

/2

4 Vj.C-'M ~(x = y)",w.) = 1
5 Vj,

Assumption

some element u of D,

assigns to "x" and "y" in some world

some element u of D.

Clearly, therefore,

we cannot read (M~l), given this formal interpretation, as
•'There

is something which is identical with itself, but it

is possible that rt is not identical with itself

for the

second occurrences of "x" and "y" do not have for their
values that individual which is the value of "x" and "y" in
their initial occurrences.

Since, therefore, the quantifiers

"(Ex)" and "(Ey)" cannot bind every occurrence of "x" and "y"
in (M~l), the result of this treatment of variables is only

apparent binding of variables; and consequently it is doubtful

whether (M~l) makes any statement at all.
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CHAPTER SIX
IS THERE A REED FOR QUANTIFYING INTO OPAQUE
CONTEXTS?:

A STUDY OF AN ARGUMENT OF HINTUCKA'S

$ 1 A

Paradoxical Result

A good deal of attention has been given to the
Question
whether quantification into referentially opaque contexts

is

possible or not.

No one to my knowledge, except Jaakko Hintikka,
has ever suggested that quantification into referentially
opaque

contexts is sometimes necessary.
of his book, Knowledge and Belief

The suggestion occurs in 6.7
1
.

My aim in this section is

to ascertain, on the basis of that discussion, the conditions

under which this necessity is thought to exist.
From all indications, the author takes the following
conditions to be sufficient:
the contexts are epistemic
(the contexts are governed by a phrase like "knows that");

and (trivially) we quantify into these contexts (a quantifier
outside the context binds a variable inside the context).
The line of reasoning is apparently this:

It is

necessary

that, if we quantify into epistemic contexts, then these

contexts are construed as referentially opaque, because the

— construing these contexts as
transparent — has the "paradoxical result"
alternative

referentially
p

that

Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal

(1)

= the dictator

of Portugal

and
(2)

The dictator of Portugal = Salazar

imply
(3)

Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal = Salazar,
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124
and (3) implies
(4)

(Ex) (Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal =
x ),

an inference which is invalid, from an intuitive point of
view.
"It follows that no one can help knowing who Portugal's
dictator
is as soon as one knows that Portugal is a dictatorship."^

(Hintikka's interpretation of these sentences needs to be
examined with some casre but I reserve such an examination
,

for §2.)

The necessity in question is thus a semantical

necessity.
On the basis of what I find given, I shall assume that
the proposition urged by Hintikka is the following:
(

A)

is

(semantically) necessary that, if we quantify

into epistemic contexts, then these contexts are

construed as ref erentially opaque.
I

would stress my belief that there is, however, at best

a suggestion of an argument for (a).

That there is an argument

is suggested by the fact that Hintikka's discussion is entitled,

"The necessity of quantifying into opaque contexts;" yet

I

find

no set of statements within this discussion which could be

identified as an argument for this necessity.

An argument that does explicitly occur on these pages
has as its conclusion that W. V. Quine's account, which allows
only quantification into ref erentially transparent contexts,
is unacceptable, for the reason that this account allows the

inference from (1), taken transparently, and

(

2

)

to

(

4 ).

Indeed, Hintikka's purpose in this section seems to be to

reveal a difficulty for Quine's proposals, which is not a

difficulty for his own approach.

Now if we suppose that

the section under consideration lives up to its title, we

naturally seek to make explicit those premises that validly
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imply the necessity of doing epistemic
logic in, essentially,
Hintikka's way. But the only relevant
information we are
given is that something is wrong with a
certain account
according to which we may quantify only
into ref erentially
transparent contexts and that no fault can
he found with the
author's own approach.
It is apparent,

then, that Hintikka—
if he does presume to have shown the
necessity in question—
presupposes that the difficulty he imputes to
Quine's

treatment
is a difficulty for any treatment allowing
only quantification
into referentially transparent contexts.

This presupposition is however not true, as
I am sure
Hintikka now realizes. The line of argument used by
him
against Quine cannot be used against a treatment of
epistemic
contexts in which only a restricted class of referring
expressions
count as interpretations of the set of individual
constants of
the system. These referring expressions satisfy
rather special
semantical conditions.

In particular,

satisfaction of these
conditions is intended to ensure the intuitive validity of
the rules (SI ) and (EG ) in the system. All other
referring
Q

q

expressions, save pronouns, are treated as definite descriptions
and eliminated.

An example of an epistemic system with such restricted
individual constants, as we might call them, has been proposed
by Dagfinn Follesdal. ^ A "name-like expression" _a is a genuine
name, Follesdal says, only if it satisfies the condition:
r (Ey)K (x)(xa's = x
= y) n
a

operator and

_a

,

where »K" is an epistemic

is a variable over name— like expressions

(presumably, all proper nouns and descriptive phrases)

As Hintikka has interpreted this condition, ^ interpretations
of individual constants in Follesdal' s system name only those

individuals known to

ja.

This is surely a correct interpretation,
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and this restriction on vocabulary is precisely what
is semantically
required for substitution and generalization inside
the scope
of epistemic operators, if restrictions are not
placed elsewhere
(namely, as per Hintikka, in the substitution and
generalization

rules )
But this restriction at the same time disallows the
inference
required by Hintikka* s argument; for that argument presupposes
that any referring expression, as long as it has a unique
reference,
may be treated as an individual constant. But if Tom does not

who Salazar is, then "Salazar" is not an individual constant
in (2), open to substitutions and upon which we may generalize.

rcnow

This does not preclude the possibility that (3) and
(4)
are otherwise inferable from (l) and (2). Given Hintikka'
peculiar interpretation of (1) and Russell and Quine's procedure
for eliminating descriptions, hidden and unhidden, recommended

by Follesdal, ordinary quantification laws applied to the

unabbreviated forms of (1) through (4) are sufficient to yield
the inference.
(The proof is sketched in my footnote 9.)
But this inference is not open to Hintikka'

intuitive invalidity, as will become clear,
we examine Hintikka'

s

objection of

s
I

believe, when

interpretation in ^2.

Of course, the idea of placing semantical conditions on

one's syntax in order to ensure the validity (SI
is not new.

It was suggested,

Q)

and (EG^)

if not advocated, by Church

in 1943;^ and the idea was adopted by some modal logicians

as a partial solution to some famous problems raised by

Quine (as reviewed in Chapter IV).

between "names" in Follesdal

's

The formal similarities

epistemic system and those

"proper names" of the earlier modal systems of Smullyan,
Barcan, Fitch, and others, should be apparent.

What matters in all of this, for my immediate aims, is
that, since not all treatments allowing only quantification
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into referentially transparent contexts
are open to Hintikka's
objection, the line of argument used by
him against Quine's
position does not support an argument for
the proposition
I originally took Eintikka to be
urging.
However, Hmtikka may have proved the
need for quantifying
into referentially opaque contexts, when
a system satisfies,
in addition to the conditions given in
(a), the condition that
at least one epistemic context of the
system is a construction
on a normal individual constant; where by
a "normal" individual
constant it is meant that an interpretation of
the constant

fulfills only the normal condition of being a
referring expression
which has a unique reference. For "Salazar", in
(3), is suitable
as an interpretation of an individual constant in
such a system:
(3) is an epistemic context; and, finally, if epistemic contexts
in (1) through (4) are referentially transparent,
then one does

get the inference from (1) and (2) to

generalizing on
WI*iii n S s

(

4 ) by substituting and

Salazar".

Furthermore, it is clear from his
that Quine does treat referring expressions which
have

unique references as individual constants.

And even if he

did not, we could hypothesize such a treatment.

Accordingly,

I

shall suppose that the proposition urged

by Eintikka is the following:
(B)

It is (semantically) necessary that, for any epistemic

context

^_a,

if a is a normal individual constant and

we quantify into ^a^, then

^ _a

is construed as referentially

opaque
I

further suppose that Quine's position is that we may

quantify into epistemic contexts that are constructions on
normal individual constants, as long as these contexts are
construed as referentially transparent.
On these suppositions, I shall show in the following section
that Hintikka has not proved this need either.
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§ 2 Eliminating the Paradox

Quine's preference for normal constants over
restricted
restricted constants influenced an analysis of contexts
of

propositional attitude (in "Quantifiers and Propositional
Attitudes" 7 ), according to which constants have to he

outside

modalized areas in a sentence.

(Quine uses, instead of

operators, special parentheses or brackets to depict, by
enclosure, modalized areas in a sentence.) Although a
ref erentially transparent treatment of said contexts does
not rule out the possibility that all constants occur inside

modalized areas

if one

class of constants

mutandis

,

—

I

is willing to countenance a restricted

find Quine's procedure to be, mutatis

perhaps, one possible treatment among others.

In what follows I outline the manner in which I defend this

claim against Hintikka's challenge.

In what follows I shall

also treat "the dictator of Portugal" as a name and hence
an individual constant, for Hintikka's line of argument is

unaffected and is made simpler by this provision.
Hintikka's argument may now be put as follows:

Quine's

account is unacceptable, for the reason that it allows the
inference from (1) to (4), and this inference is intuitively
invalid.
But it is not obvious that the inference from

(

1

)

to (4)

is intuitively invalid, if (1) is construed as referentially

transparent.

Therefore, another argument, for the intuitive

invalidity of the inference, is required to sustain the first
argument.

This argument, which has been clarified considerably

in Hintikka's paper, "Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing,"

may be put as follows:
(a) Construed as referentially transparent,

(l) is true

as soon as Tom knows of the individual who in fact is the
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dictator of Portugal that he is
self-identical.
(b) Construed as ref erentially
transparent

(1) implies (4).

,

(o) But (4) is not true as soon
as Tom knows of some
individual or other that he is
self-identical (for
(4) is true
only if Tom knows of some individual
or other that he is the
dictator of Portugal ; in other words,
(4) i s true only if
Tom knows who the dictator of Portugal
is).

Therefore, the inference from
(1), construed as referentially
transparent, to (4) is invalid.

—

I shall argue that this argument

is unsound that if a
(
)
is true, then (c) is false; that if
(c) is true, then (a) is
false.
I shall proceed by assuming the truth
of (a).

According to Hintikka, the sentence
(

1

)

Tom knows that the dictator of Portugal = the
dictator
of Portugal

has a referentially transparent sense which we
might call
inform ative
(This italicized term is my own,

but
it is drawn, derivatively, from phrases used
in the same or
.

relevantly similar connections by Hintikka and Quine.)
I shall
not attempt to define this italicized term but will
mention
only what is pertinent; namely, that, according to
Hintikka,
in an analysis of (1), in its trivially informative
referentially
transparent sense, no individual constant occurs within the

scope of the operator, "knows that."

Hintikka characterizes

what he takes to be this sense of (1) by
(5 )

(Ex)(x = d & Tom knows that (x = x))

(intuitively, "Tom knows of the individual who in fact is the

dictator of Portugal that he is self-identical").
is called by Hintikka (in the paper to which

I

This sense

just referred)
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the "totally transparent" sense of (l), by
which he means
that both occurrences of "the dictator of
Portugal" in (l),
on this interpretation, are outside the
scope of "knows that."
The possibility of such a reading perhaps
never occurred

to Quine (perhaps still does not); but what

m

I

am more interested

pointing out is that, supposing there is such a sense
of (l),
we can obtain an equally effective characterization
of that
sense using Quine's abstraction notation for monadic
intensions
or attributes.
Thus:
(6)

Tom knows z/z =

z

]

of d

The normal, or "partially transparent," reading of (l)
is
characterized by Hintikka as
(7)

(Ex)(x = d & Tom knows that (x = d))

(intuitively, "Tom knows of the individual who in fact is the
dictator of Portugal that he is the dictator of Portugal").

But this sense, again, is characterizable equally well in
Quine's notation by
(8)

Tom knows z/z = d7 of d
The upshot of Hintikka'

s

argument is that, in Quine's

treatment, we may infer a not trivially informative (hereafter,

"informative") existential statement
(9)

(Ex)(Tom knows that d = x)

(by the rule (EG

from a trivially informative (hereafter,
q ))
"uninformative") statement
(10) Tom knows that d = d,

where both occurrences of "d" in (10) are transparent.
But it is not clear that

(

9

)

is.

informative, if "d" occurs

transparently in (9); for (9) seems to be an abbreviated form

much as (10) is.

,
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If there is a deficiency here at
all,

it is that Quine's

analysis is not so fine-grained as Hintikka's.
place where Quine discusses the possibility

(i know of no

of totally transparent

readings of the kind exemplified in
(10). )
But this is not
a deficiency in the rules of inference,
as can easily be seen.
Suppose we have differentiated the uninformative
from
the

informative transparent readings of sentences
like (l) in the
manner of (6) and (8), respectively, which correspond
to

Hintikka's (5) and (7), respectively. Then
existential
generalization with respect to occurrences of "d"
in

(6) and

(8) takes us from the uninformative to the uninformative

(11) (Ex) (Tom knows z/z = £7 of x),

and from the informative to the informative
(12)

(Ex) (Tom knows z/z = dj of x),

exactly as desired.

(Exactly analogous existential statements
9
are inferable in Hintikka's system from
(5) and (7).)
I conclude

that Hintikka's analysis of (1) through
( 4 )
does not support an argument for (B). Nor do I find any

feasible alternative to (B).

It is of course true that if

there are circumstances under which an intuitively invalid
inference is admissible by and only by construing contexts
in one of two alternative ways, then there is a need for

construing these contexts the other way.

But I submit that

Hintikka has failed to indicate the circumstances under which
any views of those who allow only quantification into referentially
transparent contexts imply the admissibility of an intuitively
invalid inference.^
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief fT+.v^^r,
uxnaca, N.Y.
Cornell University Presi 1962 ).

f

0
"Semantics for Propositional Attitudes"
in jjgj_els for modal it is
(New York: Humanities Press,
1969)
pp. 97-9o, wherein the argument reappears essentially

VniJw

unaltered.

^Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief

op . crt.

,

,

p.

143

.

Dagfinn Follesdal, "Knowledge, Identity, and
Existence,"

Theona

,

33 (1967), pp. 1-27-

5

Jaakko Hintikka, "Existence and Identity in
Epistemic
Contexts: A Comment on Follesdal's Paper," Theoria,
*
33 (1967)
~
pp. 138-147.
’

’

Alonzo Church, Review of Quine's "Notes on Existence and
Necessity," Journal of Symbolic Logic 8
(1943), pp. 45 47 .

,

7

W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes"
in The^ Hays of Paradox (New York: Random House,
1966), pp. I 83 -I 94 .
8

Jaakko Hintikka, "Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing"
Philosophical Studies 20 (1969), pp. 4 - 8
,

.

9

An alternative version of the inference is obtainable in
Follesdal's system.
(l) becomes:

)

(Ex)((y)(Dy - y = x)
becomes:

and

(Ex)((y)(Dy = y = x)
becomes:

(

2

(

3

)

(Ex)((y)(Dy = y = x)

•

(Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z)

•

•

(Ez)((y)(Sy = y = z)

•

K (x = z)))
t
x = z))

(Ez)((y)(Sy = y = z)
K (x = z)))
t
But the inference from (l) and ( 2 ) to (3), by ordinary quantification
laws, is unobjectionable. Finally, ( 4 ) becomes:
•

(Ex)((Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z)

•

•

K (x = z)))
t

which is inferable directly from (l), the inference being
equally unobjectionable:
Assume: (y)(Dy = y = u)
(Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z)
(Ez)((y)(Dy = y = z)
K (u = z))
(Ex)( (Ez)((y)(Dy = y = zj
K (x = z)))
t
•

.

•

•

K. (u =

z))
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It would have been quite impossible
for me to have assessed
this argument as I have without benefit of
the illuminating
exohanges between Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.
("A Note on an Ar 4ent
of Hintikka s,
Philosophical Studies , 18 (1967)
12-14pp
and "On a Proposed System of Epistemic
Logic," Nous 9 H Qi^P >
’’
PP. 396-398) and
( "Partially
Knowing,
o£. cit . )
in which this argument is discussed.
.
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